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PRIVATIZING  MASS  SETTLEMENT
Jaime Dodge*
ABSTRACT
From BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico to the National Football League’s (NFL) inability
to honor Super Bowl tickets, corporate defendants are contravening the established litigation
wisdom and offering full compensation to victims—without haggling to pay pennies on the
dollar, without stall tactics and frivolous motions; indeed, without any litigation at all.  These
offers have often been dismissed as rare one-off exceptions to the rule.  This Article challenges that
claim, suggesting that these private mass settlements are instead relatively common features in
our aggregate litigation system.
The Article explores the reasons that, contrary to traditional wisdom, defendants would
voluntarily settle claims.  It argues that in cases of clear culpability, defendants can mitigate the
harm to corporate reputation and reassure shareholders.  But, these settlements can also operate
at the opposite end of the spectrum, with far more substantial consequences.  Correctly structured,
these settlement offers allow defendants to preclude the certification of a class action.  These settle-
ments thus offer an incredibly powerful tool in deterring or rendering impotent nuisance-value
litigation by de facto converting any claim from an opt-out class action into an opt-in settlement.
While arbitration provisions have been used as a mechanism for preventing class certification,
they inherently can only reach contractual relationships; bilateral mass settlements are not so
constricted, allowing them to reach any mass claim.
This transition from opt-out to opt-in mechanisms upends the traditionally assumed rela-
tionship between the interests of compensation, deterrence, and legitimacy with respect to mass
wrongs.  This balance is far more complex than has been posited in the existing analyses and
demonstrates that the twin fundamental assumptions of our class action system are not unchang-
ing truths but instead mere default positions.  Indeed, in this new world, defendants now have
the ability to prevent almost every class from being certified against them—yet, as the analysis
demonstrates, they may not choose to do so.  In short, this Article seeks to replace our conception of
the public aggregate litigation system with a new, more comprehensive model that also incorpo-
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rates the private ordering that is driving this new emerging generation of aggregate claims
mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Class actions held the promise of remedying previously irremediable
harms, from low-value claims1 to catastrophic mass torts.2  Yet, despite this
promise, the class action mechanism has been broadly criticized from every
side.  Defendants complain of nuisance suits,3 blackmail suits,4 and over-
enforcement;5 each skewing damages—and, in turn, undermining deter-
rence.  At the same time, agency problems,6 coupon settlements,7 competing
litigation,8 and, more recently, claims forms9 have all contributed to an envi-
ronment in which few absent class members recover meaningful compensa-
tion.10  And, all of this occurs as an exception to our ordinary expectation
that an individual should be the master of his own claim, raising fundamental
1 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the
emergence of aggregate litigation through Rule 23 was largely an attempt to vindicate “the
rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring
their opponents into court at all” (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
2 See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1429 (2d Cir. 1993).
3 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Prob-
lem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1879–90 (2004); James J. Park, Rules,
Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 161 (2012)
(discussing the incentive of entrepreneurial enforcers to bring low probability claims).
4 See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2000).
5 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
396–98 (2010).
6 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 677–84 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attor-
ney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1991).
7 The use of coupon settlements was restricted by Congress when it passed the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (2005).
8 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 514–15
(1996).
9 See Tiffaney Allen, Anticipating Claims Filing Rates in Class Actions, RUST CONSULT-
ING (Nov. 2008), http://www.rustconsulting.com/Knowledge_Sharing/Articles_and_Publi
cations/ID/124/Anticipating_Claims_Filing_Rates_in_Class_Action_Settlements.
10 Others have focused upon the practice of settling class claims without even attempt-
ing to make distributions to the class—a phenomenon that has troubled class action schol-
ars who view the practice as an abandonment of one’s duty to the class in favor of a
charitable group comprised of individuals that are not clients (but are instead, for exam-
ple, political allies). See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 528–29 (2012) (describing objections
to cy pres distributions and documenting examples of politically directed cy pres recoveries).
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questions about whether the autonomy costs of the class action are too
high.11
Given these critiques from all sides, it might be unsurprising that parties
are experimenting with privatizing the mass settlement process.  With the
high stakes of class action trials, settlements have become the inevitable end
game.12  Recognizing that the case will ultimately end in a settlement facility
administered by a private claims administrator, defendants can short-circuit
the litigation process by creating the facility at the outset.  The Gulf Coast
Claims Facility (GCCF) created by BP to satisfy its statutory obligations in the
wake of Deepwater Horizon’s explosion has become the most prominent
example of a private settlement fund.13  Perhaps for this reason, many schol-
ars have dismissed the fund as a one-off oddity driven by a unique statutory
scheme.14  But, corporations have not.
At both sides of the class action spectrum, would-be defendants are
exploring the use of private settlement funds as a superior alternative to the
litigation process.  Companies responsible for mass torts are now announcing
the creation of private claims funds in the immediate aftermath of the tort as
a component of their public relations rehabilitation or crisis management
efforts.15  At the opposite end of the spectrum, savvy defendants are creating
11 See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 805 (1997)
(“Class actions occupy an uncertain position in Anglo-American law.  Nowhere else do we
find such a clear departure from the premise that no one should be bound to a judgment
in personam absent the personal security offered by notice and a full opportunity to par-
ticipate in the underlying litigation.”).
12 See, e.g., ROBERT H. KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGA-
TION 415 (2d ed. 2006) (“Relatively few class actions actually go to trial; most settle, either
after the certification decision or as trial approaches.”).  For an excellent discussion of the
dynamics of modern class settlements, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2008).
13 For the official website of the Gulf Coast claims fund, see GULF COAST CLAIMS FACIL-
ITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).  Although BP would
ultimately reach a class action settlement approved in 2012, BP resolved more than two
thirds of its claims—more than $7.8 billion, see Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, How
a Gulf Settlement that BP Once Hailed Became Its Target, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2014, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/us/how-a-gulf-settlement-that-bp-once-hailed-became-its-target
.html (noting the amount), through a private claim resolution facility required by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990. See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012).
14 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Remedies for Big Disasters: The BP Gulf Oil Spill and the Quest
for Complete Justice, 45 AKRON L. REV. 567, 570–73 (2012) (summarizing the conclusion of
symposium participants that the GCCF should not serve as a template for other disasters or
compensation programs).
15 See Chevron Has Paid Out $10 Million for Refinery Fire, ABC7 NEWS (Jan. 30, 2013, 7:45
PM) http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=8973226; see also
Jeff Bennett, GM Compensation Fund to Offer Payments for Recalled Car Accidents, WALL ST.
J., June 30, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/gm-compensation-plan-to-offer-payments-
for-recalled-car-accidents-1404136801; Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence
Fracking Claims with Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-with-sealed-settlements
.html; Bruce Einhorn, Plane Disaster in Ukraine Deepens Malaysia Airlines’ Tragic Year, BLOOM-
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programs to address small-value and outlier claims in an effort to provide
superior compensation to those affected while simultaneously avoiding the
vast expenditure of resources on frivolous claims that have become the hall-
mark of class litigation for so many defendants.16
Yet, our scholarship continues to conceive of mass claims resolution
through the lens of public aggregate litigation—class actions and, in recent
years, multi-district litigation (MDL).17  If we speak of private ordering, the
conversation typically focuses only upon pre-dispute arbitration as a mecha-
nism for preventing aggregation.18  As a consequence, many of these innova-
tions are dismissed as ad hoc responses to extraordinary situations.19
BERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 17, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-17/
ukraine-plane-crash-deepens-malaysian-airlines-tragic-year; John Hoeffel, PG&E Announces
$100-million Relief Fund for San Bruno Gas Explosion Victims, L.A. NOW (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:38
PM) http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/09/pge-announces-100-million-relief-
fund-for-san-bruno-gas-explosion-victims.html; Gaia Pianigiani, Stricken Cruise Ship’s Opera-
tor Offers Settlements to Passengers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
01/28/world/europe/costa-cruises-offers-settlement-to-shipwreck-passengers.html?_r=0;
Amy Schoenfeld, Where BP’s Money Is Landing, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/07/04/business/04metricstext.html.
16 See Daniel H. Gold & John Tancabel, Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation: Com-
pany’s Voluntary Reimbursement Plan Defeats Class Certification, HAYNES BOONE LLP
(Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Alerts/Aqua_
Dots_Product_Liability.pdf; Jeremy Stahl, Gameday Theory, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2011, 1:49 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2011/02/gameday_theory.html.
17 When federal civil actions pending in different districts have common questions of
fact, MDL is utilized to combine and transfer the actions to any district for consolidated
pretrial proceedings.  28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).  The new trend within the scholarship has
been toward the recognition of quasi-class action settlement structures through MDL as
contrasted with traditional class actions; yet both mechanisms fall within the traditional
conception of aggregation. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2012); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370, 371 (2000); Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 963 (2012); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-
Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 107, 110–11 (2010).
18 For extended discussions of the relationship between ex ante and ex post systems,
see Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63
EMORY L.J. 1253 (2014); D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J.
TORT LAW 91 (2012).
19 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 14, at 570 (summarizing the conclusion of symposium
participants that the GCCF should not serve as a template for other disasters or compensa-
tion programs); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1114, 1118
(2010) (attributing the lack of scholarship on public funds to the conception that they are
“sui generis” products of “special legislation”).  For studies of particular tribunals, see KEN-
NETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? (2005) (discussing the development of the Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (September 11 Fund)); Robert M.
Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to
National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135, 205 (2005); Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate
Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1831–32 (2002); Byron G.
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I argue that we are witnessing the birth of a new privatized mechanism
for mass claims resolutions, competing with the traditional public aggrega-
tion mechanisms.  Most commonly, these private mass settlements consist of
a unilateral settlement offer by the defendant, which each victim may then
accept, forming a bilateral settlement agreement—thereby avoiding the pro-
cedural hurdles associated with judicial aggregation and its associated agency
costs and due process checks.
These settlements contravene the traditional conception of defendants
resisting settlement and attempting to delay resolution and impose costs
upon plaintiffs as they pursue low-probability defenses.20  These emerging
structures are based upon a wholly different dispute resolution methodology
than those described in the existing literature—one that bypasses the deter-
mination of common questions at the core of aggregate mechanisms
entirely.21  Instead, these mechanisms use individualized claims determina-
tion as the vehicle for mass claims resolution—whether culminating in a
claims settlement fund22 or simply direct payments from the defendant.
Private mass settlements give defendants no less than the option to avoid
class actions altogether—substantially limiting the experiment with aggrega-
tion that has occurred over the last half century.23  This completely upends
our understanding of the nature of aggregation, creating a completely new
generation of mass claims strategies—with a completely new effectuation of
compensation, deterrence, efficiency, and legitimacy—unlike any of its
predecessors.24
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I of this Article demonstrates
that the emergence of private mass settlements reveals the error of the funda-
mental premises upon which the class action system is built.  This Part then
Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency and Independence in
Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 255, 255–57 (2011).
20 See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 18–19 (2007).
21 Leading scholars are now focused upon doctrinal trends within aggregation toward
smaller classes and multi-district litigation—what I suggest here is a far more fundamental
shift in mass claims resolution. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667 (2013) (discussing trend toward smaller classes); Alexandra D.
Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012) (discussing the trend
towards class sampling and the effects on class-action outcome equality).
22 See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361, 1380–81 (2005) (“Except for the option of individual trials, all of the currently
available litigation procedures for an endgame in disputes involving large numbers of
claims contemplate a claims resolution facility.  [Rule 23 federal class actions], state class
actions, bankruptcy, multidistrict litigation, and mass settlements all reach closure with a
claims resolution facility.”).
23 Post-dispute, defendants in contract and tort actions alike can now use disaggrega-
tive settlements not just to deter the filing of a class action, but to prevent a class action
altogether. See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1209–10
(10th Cir. 2012); In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011).
24 Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Designing Compensatory Funds: In Search of First Principles, 3
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=24663
01.
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analyzes the market for these offers and demonstrates that these offers have
the capacity to generate simultaneous win-win outcomes for both the defen-
dant and the claimants—a remarkable assertion, suggesting the superiority of
these offers from the perspective of the parties.
Part II takes on the emerging consensus in the developing literature.  It
first seeks to demonstrate that these offers have the capacity to drift in both
directions from the optimal compensation value, rather than reliably disfa-
voring claimants.  It then turns to the “lesson” of BP—that MDLs offer better
results for both claimants and defendants than private claims funds.  This
Part argues that the conventional explanations for the superiority of MDL
cannot rationally account for the compensation differential, and instead
identifies extrinsic causes.  This insight raises not only difficult normative
questions about the entanglement of public and private litigation, but also
suggests limitations on the predictive value of BP in future mass claims
settlements.
Part III of this Article then explores the strategic use—and limits—of
private mass settlement funds.  This Part argues that privatization can be an
incredibly effective mechanism for deterring frivolous nuisance suits, which
have typically represented a large component of many companies’ complex
litigation budgets.  This Part then posits that private funds can also be a use-
ful component at the opposite end of the litigation spectrum as part of a
disaster mitigation strategy.  Apart from these potentially effective uses, the
discussion also focuses on identifying the factors that make privatization less
likely to offer a superior resolution for the corporation, and the situations in
which we should expect to see fewer unilateral settlement offers by
defendants.
Part IV of this Article situates bilateral settlements within the broader
transitions occurring in aggregation mechanisms.  This Part argues that
unlike the practical limitations upon arbitration and MDL, bilateral mass set-
tlement is able to reach any type of claim—and convert it from the opt-out
regime of class actions.  This is a remarkable step in the evolution of aggrega-
tion, giving rise to a new generation of mass claims enforcement in which
opt-in rather than opt-out mechanisms are poised to obtain dominance given
their grassroots popularity and remarkable potential for superior outcomes
for both the defendant and claimants.  But, this analysis also reveals that the
emerging doctrine creates gaps in the closure afforded by bilateral settle-
ments.  The result is an overall picture of enforcement that is increasingly
discordant—a result that impedes compensation, deterrence, efficiency, and
legitimacy.  Finally, the Article concludes by offering some observations
about the consequences of bilateral mass settlement for the doctrine and
theory of mass claims and aggregation.
I. THE PARADOX OF PRIVATE MASS SETTLEMENT
The proliferation of early individualized settlement offers contravenes
the established wisdom that defendants will assert class-wide defenses and
insist upon individualized proof as a means of threatening to increase the
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cost of litigation and thus decrease settlement values.25  At the outset then,
one must wonder why defendants would make unilateral settlement offers,
surrendering the bargaining power derived from delay.26
The paradox of the resulting bilateral settlement contracts only deepens
when one considers that defendants do not obtain the most important bene-
fit of a class action: closure.27  A final judgment or class settlement binds all
of the class members, precluding the entire class from filing later litigation
on this matter—even if they did not receive any compensation (or, worse yet,
lost on the merits).  “Buying peace” is thus the primary motivation of defend-
ants in most class settlements.28  Yet, bilateral mass settlements do not bind
anyone other than those individuals who accept the offer—and thus offer no
peace, no closure.  This Part explores the mistaken assumptions about both
the nature of aggregation and the dynamics of bilateral mass settlement that
drive this disconnect between theory and real-world experience.
A. Rethinking the Fundamental Premises of Aggregation
This Section posits that the predictions that private mass settlements
would remain mere one-offs have proven inaccurate because the default
rules of aggregation are based on a number of false premises.  Identifying
these false assumptions has allowed corporations to craft mechanisms that
alter these features of the system, creating alternatives that are potentially
superior for both participants.
1. The Fallacy of Aggregation’s Efficiency
The public aggregate litigation system is assumed to yield greater effi-
ciencies than seriatim litigation because it avoids the need for duplicative
litigation of the same claim by each victim.29  Aggregation thus enables a
pooling of resources across victims that corrects the investment asymmetries
that would otherwise cripple effective vindication in many small-value
25 See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97. 111–54 (2009).
26 See FEINBERG, supra note 19 (arguing that private defendants would not have an
incentive to enter into early, post-dispute settlement regimes).
27 See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265, 270–74 (2011).
28 See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 (2002) (discussing the asbestos, silicone gel breast
implant, and fen-phen class settlements, which he noted “all aspire to create some form of
private administrative system” that “promises more efficient compensation for plaintiffs,
long-term peace for defendants, and a reduced litigation burden for the courts”).
29 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (describing seriatim reso-
lution of asbestos claims as generating transaction costs that “‘exceed the victims’ recovery
by nearly two to one’” while causing long delays as “‘the same issues are litigated over and
over’” (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 2–3 (1991) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE])).
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claims.30  Indeed, it was the vindication of small-value claims that would indi-
vidually be negative-value claims—as the costs of litigation would exceed the
potential recovery—that prompted the creation of Rule 23(b)(3).31
Yet, the impetus for these funds lays in the recognition that the costs of
aggregation can often exceed the benefit.32  Thus, even in cases with substan-
tial common questions of general liability, the costs of aggregation may over-
whelm the benefit to the parties—making opting out a mutually value-
enhancing option.33
How can this be?  While aggregation can offer efficiencies by avoiding
the costs of duplicative merits litigation, it generates new procedural costs.
The costs of class certification and settlement approval can often represent
substantially the entire recovery obtained by plaintiffs—and this is before one
includes defense costs.34  But, parties should rationally pursue litigation only
so long as the anticipated joint future costs of litigation are less than the
difference in expected value between the two sides.  Reconceptualized in this
manner, the litigation costs can be redistributed to the parties to expand the
net joint gains possible through settlement—simultaneously allowing both
the plaintiff and defendant to be made better off in some cases through bilat-
eral settlement than in aggregate litigation.
2. Revisiting the Class Action as Compensation Mechanism
Modern class actions are often conceived as a mechanism for permitting
absent class members to receive compensation for wrongs they would other-
wise not have pursued individually.  The class action overcomes not only the
litigation cost of pursuing these damages, but even the opportunity cost by
presumptively incorporating all class members.  Individual class members
then have the opportunity to affirmatively opt out.  But aggregation often
does not deliver on the dual promises of compensation and a meaningful
ability to opt out.
First, with respect to small-value claims, the opportunity cost of investiga-
tion and participation often generates a high rate of passivity among class
30 See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1380–81; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litiga-
tion Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (2002).
31 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
32 See, e.g., id. at 598 (noting that the transaction costs were exceeding recovery in the
asbestos cases by a 2:1 ratio).
33 Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Para-
dox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 397–401 (2014).
34 See Burch, supra note 17, at 1274–82 (discussing agency problems in both class
actions and MDL and the possibility of third-party financiers acting as monitors in the
context of nonclass aggregative litigation to help manage principal-agent problems);
Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in Representative Actions,
63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (2014) (discussing the agency costs inherent in representative
actions and the potential impact of alternative litigation financing); Macey & Miller, supra
note 6, at 7–8 (discussing agency in the context of Rule 23 class litigation and MDL as well
as the agency costs unique to aggregate litigation).
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members—even when compensation is guaranteed.35  While this means that
they do not opt out, it also means that they often disregard notices and do
not file claims forms.36  Where these forms are required, on average 80 to
98% of class members find themselves in the worst possible compensation
situation: they receive no compensation, but as class members are fully pre-
cluded from future litigation.37
Second, because opt-out rates are typically less than 1%,38 for individuals
who are dissatisfied by the settlement the choice is effectively between class
participation and single-plaintiff litigation.  If one presumes that attorneys’
fees and costs will represent 30%—and further assumes away the time value
of money and any risk aversion39—unless the compensation offered by the
settlement is perceived as offering less than 70% of the expected compensa-
tion, the absent class member should still remain in the class.  Of course,
reality is not this favorable: given that class actions retain their greatest vitality
with small-value claims, in many cases the litigation costs for the plaintiff will
entirely dwarf the expected recovery in litigation.40  Thus, even if the individ-
35 See Allen, supra note 9 (noting that where an absent class member simply needs to
return a form to obtain compensation, the filing rates range from 2–20%, with the higher
rates reserved for cases involving greater compensation).
36 In order to provide compensation, the claims administrator must be able to deter-
mine who is in the class, the compensation due under the settlement, and have a mecha-
nism for payment.  In a small subset of cases, the defendant may have all of this
information.  For example, a bank accused of overcharging can review records to deter-
mine which accountholders were overcharged, and then credit that amount to their
accounts.  While a few accountholders may have closed their accounts, the vast majority
can be automatically credited, leaving only a subset to receive a notice from the administra-
tor requesting updated address information for the mailing of a check.  While these abili-
ties are increasing in our increasingly technological world, claims forms are still a routine
feature of class action litigation.
37 See TIFFANEY JANOWICZ, FED’N OF DEF. & CORPORATE COUNSEL, CLASS ACTION PER-
SPECTIVES (2013), available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents/16.Class%20Ac
tion%20Perceptives.pdf (noting that where an absent class member simply needs to return
a form to obtain compensation, the filing rates range from 2–20%, with the higher rates
reserved for cases involving greater compensation).
38 The Federal Judicial Center reports that the rate of opting out in class actions is
typically 0.1%. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAG-
ING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 20 (2005).
39 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597–98 (1997) (holding the class
settlement proposing global resolution of current and future claims could not be certified
consistent with due process, but noting that lack of certification meant that “‘future claim-
ants may lose altogether’” given the specter of exhaustion of assets (quoting REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 29, at 2–3)).
40 These expectations have been confirmed by a recent study of securities class actions,
which found that while 3% of all class action settlements had at least one opt-out case, 53%
of class settlements with at least $500 million in class settlement funds drew opt-out litiga-
tion. AMIR ROZEN ET AL., OPT-OUT CASES IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 1
(2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/7cf8bd53-9e0b-45be-
b4b3-3d810dfe2be3/Opt-Out-Cases-in-Securities-Class-Action-Settlemen.aspx.  The study
further found that the most frequent opt-out plaintiffs are pension funds and other asset
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ual believes that his particular wrong is being undercompensated due to the
allocation methodology selected, in most cases the error (no matter how
great) cannot overcome the costs of single-plaintiff litigation.41  For this rea-
son, opt-out rates remain at less than 1%.  Despite the promise of opting out,
the reality is that aggregation has placed a heavy weight on the scale in favor
of remaining in the class.
3. Rethinking Aggregation as Mechanism for Optimal Enforcement
Even if the class action device does not routinely provide meaningful
compensation, proponents argue that it is still worthwhile because it has a
unique ability to further the public interest in the enforcement of law and
deterrence.  Indeed, this goal of law enforcement and deterrence—rather
than compensation—was the primary motive in the adoption of Rule 23.42
Yet many bilateral mass settlements operate, in part, by upending this
linkage.
The vast majority of class actions focus upon small-value and medium-
value claims, as to which opt-out rates will be low, but so too will opt-in
rates.43  Thus, the direction of the presumption has a dramatic impact on the
value of damages at stake.  Ordinarily, in the baseline world of the single
plaintiff, an individual has the right to pursue his claim.  But if he declines to,
the law rarely appoints another to vindicate that claim on his behalf.  The
class action thus works a radical reversal by allowing one aggrieved individual
management companies, not individual investors. Id.  Finally, the study noted that opt-out
plaintiffs faced higher proportional costs and in some cases failed to recover any of their
claimed losses. Id.
41 For these individuals, objecting to the settlement may be the best option.  But, as I
have discussed elsewhere, objections are rarely filed and rarely succeed, particularly in
small-value cases. See Dodge, supra note 18, at 1268–69.
42 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
43 Collective actions provide the contrary example, of opt-in litigation.  Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), certain types of employment claims are brought not as opt-
out but opt-in cases, meaning that each victim must affirmatively join the aggregate litiga-
tion.  Of course, these claims are typically far larger than the usual class action claim, rep-
resenting recoveries of hundreds or thousands of dollars.  The size of these claims thus
incentivizes participation but, because of the streamlined procedures for wage claims, also
increases the ability of individuals to pursue their actions individually.  Yet, the participa-
tion rate in collective actions still remains between 15 and 30%. See Matthew W. Lampe &
E. Michael Rossman, Procedural Approaches for Countering the Dual-Filed FLSA Collective Action
and State-Law Wage Class Action, 20 LAB. LAW. 311, 313 (2005) (reporting 15–30% rates); see
also SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, FIGHTING TO WIN: DECONSTRUCTING CONDITIONAL & CLASS CERTI-
FICATION 10 (2012), available at http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/WHPLIT
partII.pdf (reporting 10–20% opt-in rates).  Some cases have even generated rates below
three percent. See, e.g., Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIV. 98-802-KI, 2002 WL
479840, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 9, 2002) (finding a 2.7% opt-in rate).
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to file suit on behalf of everyone similarly situated.44  This shift has prompted
a vast literature on where optimal deterrence lays.45
As reasonable people, we can see claims at both ends of the spectrum: it
seems likely that few individuals would have purchased Chobani yogurt if it
were prominently labeled as contaminated with toxic bacteria.46  So too, few
men would likely have purchased a baldness drug if they knew it would cause
impotence.47  On the other hand, only a fraction of consumers would likely
file suit over undeclared nuts in something named “Crunch’N Nutter.”48  But
the law of class certification does not currently have this capacity to apply
subjective discernment—although one could surely envision procedural
mechanisms that would allow this question or proxies for it to enter into the
process.49
* * *
Corporate counsel have often stated that the intent in employing pre-
dispute aggregation waivers is not to prevent class actions for the sake of
preventing justice.  Instead, they fear the filing of meritless litigation that will
44 In one interesting case, a California court held that, where only 5 of 53 sales repre-
sentatives opted into an FLSA collective action, it was proper to prevent certification of an
opt-out class action on the same grounds.  Zulewski v. Hershey Co., No. CIV 11-05117-KAW,
2013 WL 1748054, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).  There, the court noted that while it
agrees that not filing an opt-in form is passive and not an affirmative choice not to
opt-in, the Court is also concerned that allowing an opt-out class action, with the
knowledge that many potential class members were non-responsive to the FLSA
opt-in collective action, could amount to a deprivation of rights.
Id.
45 See Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions All the Way Down, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 20,
27 & n.57 (2013); see also Lemos, supra note 10, at 488 (“Few aspects of contemporary civil
litigation have attracted as much scholarly attention as the damages class action.  Commen-
tators have criticized class actions as either too powerful or not powerful enough.” (foot-
notes omitted)); Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 25, at 97 (“Few pretrial motions in
our civil justice system elicit as much controversy as those for the certification of class
actions.”).
46 Press Release, Chobani, Inc. Voluntarily Recalls Greek Yogurt Because of Product
Concerns, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/
ucm367298.htm.
47 Questions and Answers: Finasteride Label Changes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 11,
2012), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm299754.htm.
48 Indeed, most consumers likely assumed, with a name like Crunch’N Nutter and a
nut-shaped package, the product contained nuts.  Moreover, most of the small percentage
of consumers with allergies to peanuts would (recognizing the potential for cross-contami-
nation and that their own allergens may have shifted over time) likely make the decision to
simply select a non-nut snacking option.  Press Release, Merrell Food Group Issues Allergy
Alert on Undeclared Peanut in “Crunch’N Nutter – Mixed Nut,” U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ucm382257.htm.
49 Cf. John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1444–57 (2005) (discussing distrust of class actions by the public
and impact upon the selection and settlement of lawsuits).
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require substantial resource investments to defeat,50 or the filing of frivolous
claims that only a handful of plaintiffs would pursue.51  For fearful would-be
defendants, arbitration provisions have traditionally been the primary means
of avoiding aggregation.52  Yet, arbitration clauses can only reach a subset of
claims: those between parties that consent to a contract that is capable of
incorporating a dispute resolution clause.
Bilateral mass settlement, in contrast, can reach all types of claims—con-
tract and tort, those with pre-existing relationships and without, high value
and low value, alike.  As it does, it has the power to convert the traditional
opt-out regime into what is functionally an opt-in regime, with the corpora-
tion paying only those individuals who submit claims.  In so doing, private
settlement agreements can leverage the shortcomings of the existing aggre-
gate litigation system to create a system with greater claimant autonomy,
increased compensation, and decreased nuisance litigation.  The next two
sections turn, respectively, to the benefits most important to both parties to
the contract, which are driving this new trend: compensation to victims, and
closure for defendants.53
B. Reassessing the Claim of Victim Exploitation in Private Mass Settlement
Most of the scholarship on claims funds formed outside of the litigation
process has been highly critical.54  Indeed, even Kenneth Feinberg, the spe-
cial master for both the 9/11 Fund and the BP Gulf Coast Claims Facility, has
suggested that these were one-off funds that should not be replicated.55  But
corporations have continued to offer these funds, victims are accepting the
50 Indeed, it was precisely this fear, not of liability but of the cost of prevailing, which
prompted Congress’s creation of the September 11 Fund. See FEINBERG, supra note 19, at
17–20 (noting the costs and delay of litigation created a sense that the airlines needed to
avoid being dragged into court).
51 See, e.g., Emory School of Law, Consumer Arbitration Agreements and the Demise of Collec-
tive Dispute Resolution, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZE-
vGQb2mGM (providing a recording of the Thrower Symposium remarks of Home Depot
General Counsel and Vice President Teresa Wynn Roseborough).
52 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666–72 (2010).
53 See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 33, at 412 (identifying the same metrics for the
interests of parties to a mass tort compensation fund).
54 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 430 (2005) (“Allowing companies to simply opt
out of exposure to collective litigation is no more defensible than a system in which corpo-
rations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to federal antitrust, securities, or civil
rights laws.”); Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 33, at 402–03; Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus
Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too
Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 916 (2011) (stating that in light of the BP GCCF, “the precedent
has now been set for corporate malefactors who are caught up in the maelstrom of massive
liability to discharge their legal responsibilities on their own terms and favorable to their
own interests”).
55 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT 179 (2012) (“Like the 9/11 fund, the GCCF
is unlikely to be replicated.  It is a one-off.”).
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offers in lieu of litigation, and, as noted in the previous section, courts are
recognizing that in many cases these funds are effective enough to not just
inhibit but to preclude the filing of a class action.56
Despite the extensive literature suggesting that these funds are exploi-
tive,57 these funds are increasingly obtaining substantial participation rates.
Opt-in collective actions typically range between 10–20% participation, with
rates below 3% in small-value cases, and almost no reported cases exceeding
30% participation.58  In contrast, after its refinery explosion, Chevron cre-
ated a fund for the estimated 4,000 victims, and of those, 3,800 sought settle-
ment offers through its disaggregated claims procedure by the end of the
very week the explosion occurred—an astounding 95% participation rate.59
Likewise, the Aqua Dots recall and refund procedure obtained a 60% partici-
pation rate.60
These participation rate differentials do not prove that private mass set-
tlements offer greater compensation to victims than traditional aggregate liti-
gation.  Indeed, it may be that the compensation offered is lower, but that
other factors are driving the acceptance of the offer: the delay in compensa-
tion, the net deduction of attorneys’ fees and costs, or the uncertainty of
recovery in litigation.  But it does suggest the need to take a harder look at
the reasons victims choose to participate in these settlements at a higher rate
than those approved by the courts.
1. Low Compensation Rates in Class Actions
A number of barriers stand in front of compensation within the class
action system.  For low-value claims, even with near-perfect inclusion of class
members, the amount at stake may be so small that once the class counsel is
paid, the named plaintiffs receive their “incentive payment” (typically a few
thousand dollars), and a settlement administrator retained to provide class
notice is paid, too little remains available to distribute to class members.
Indeed, mailing a check to class members requires not merely the costs of
processing, packaging and mailing the checks, but also the maintenance of
records on the cashing of those checks, repeated mailings for bounce-backs,
the retention of investigators to attempt to locate current addresses for those
56 See supra subsection I.A.2.
57 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58 See supra subsection I.A.2.
59 See Paul Elias, Thousands File Claims After Chevron Refinery Fire, AP (Aug. 11, 2012,
4:39 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/thousands-file-claims-after-chevron-refinery-fire.
Chevron’s fund ultimately ballooned to 23,900 claims filed after 15,000 people sought
medical treatment, yielding a total payout of approximately $10 million through its claims
settlement fund. See supra note 15.
60 This rate is particularly notable given that it required return of the product and
thus, as Judge Easterbrook concluded, likely included substantial individuals that were sat-
isfied with or had previously used the product—and thus chose not to seek compensa-
tion—rather than simply what I have termed a “no-action” bias. See In re Aqua Dots Prods.
Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 750–52 (2011).
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“missing” absent class members, and, depending upon the residual, poten-
tially a secondary distribution to class members of those unclaimed funds.
Once these costs are considered, it is unsurprising that cy pres distributions of
settlement funds to charitable purposes are being selected in lieu of actual
payments of compensation to class members.61
Even if there are sufficient funds to make direct payments of compensa-
tion, settlements increasingly require class members to file a claim form to
obtain compensation.  These forms are commonly used where difficulties in
determining the identity or location of class members are anticipated, or
where there are potential variations in damages alleged.  Yet, a recent study
by Rust Consulting—one of the preeminent settlement administration
firms—found that the claims form completion rate is approximately 2–20%
in consumer cases, while higher rates obtain in securities (20%) and employ-
ment (20–85%) cases.62  This leads to the dramatic realization that, in many
class actions, only a small fraction of the harmed individuals actually receive
compensation—while preclusion operates to bar the claims of all class mem-
bers, including even those that received no compensation.63
2. The Delay and Cost of Aggregate Litigation
Aggregate litigation inherently creates additional procedural costs and
delays.  If the parties choose to utilize the class action mechanism, they must
obtain court approval of both the class certification and class settlement.
MDL does not require certification of the class representative or a proposed
settlement, because the individuals retain the autonomy to litigate and settle
their own claims.  Yet, to the extent that pretrial discovery and motion prac-
tice is being consolidated in a single court, plaintiffs’ counsel need to put
61 A cy pres distribution occurs when class damages cannot be feasibly distributed or
when a balance remains.  Under this system, the funds are to be distributed to the next
best compensation use, typically a charitable donation.  3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEW-
BERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 514–16 (4th ed. 2002).  For an excellent discussion of
the cy pres system, see William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142–71 (2004).
62 See Allen, supra note 9.
63 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07
cmt. b (2010) (recommending judges limit such payments to circumstances in which direct
distribution to individual class members is not economically feasible, or where funds
remain after class members are given a full opportunity to make a claim).
This observation does not even account for the practice of settling class claims without
even attempting to make distribution to the class—a phenomenon that has troubled class
action scholars who view the practice as an abandonment of one’s duty to the class in favor
of a charitable group comprised of individuals that are not clients (but are instead, for
example, political allies).  Yet, lawyers have argued that in small-value cases transaction
costs of payment can exceed damages. See Lemos, supra note 10, at 528–29 (describing
objections to cy pres distributions and documenting examples of politically directed cy pres
recoveries).
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additional resources into their coordination in these proceedings and may
even create a formalized plaintiffs’ steering committee.64
In addition, the defendant must bear the reciprocal costs of motion
practice65 as well as the increasingly massive costs of not only discovery but
also electronic document preservation, or risk sanction for spoliation of evi-
dence.66  In small-value cases, these costs of document preservation can actu-
ally exceed the amount at stake in the underlying litigation.  While the courts
have recognized the coercive effects of these costs, a successful motion to
dismiss will still bind only the named plaintiff unless the company bears the
costs of proceeding through class certification.67
Although the conventional wisdom has been that these procedural costs
and delays are offset by efficiencies in the merits determination, private mass
settlements are testing this assumption.  For a defendant to propose a mass-
settlement structure, it must expect that the costs of the claims fund and its
administration will be less than the cost of resolving the case through litiga-
tion.  This baseline calculation may also incorporate business considerations
such as consumer goodwill and loyalty, the value of closure for shareholders
as reflected in share price, and the time value of money.68  A potential plain-
tiff should likewise rationally accept the offer where the amount offered
through the claims fund exceeds the anticipated net recovery in litigation
after adjustments for risk tolerance, payment horizon, and other personal-
ized preferences.
The confluence of these two phenomena suggest the basis for the grass-
roots appeal of bilateral mass settlements.  The aggregate litigation system
entails substantial transaction costs that at times allows only $1 of every $3
spent by the defendant in litigation to reach the victims.69  This creates a
64 See Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multi-District Litiga-
tion, 64 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 10–30) (on file with author) (pro-
viding a discussion of internal delays within a court occasioned by the conversion to an
MDL as well as a discussion of the complexity of appointing leadership counsel and schol-
arship suggesting benefits of delayed or interim appointments); cf. DUKE LAW CTR. FOR
JUDICIAL STUD., MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE 28 (2014) (stating Best Practice
2c(ii)).
65 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (establishing a heightened
pleading standard).
66 Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 635, 644 (2012).
67 Cf. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380-83 (2011) (holding that pre-certifica-
tion decisions and statements by named plaintiffs cannot bind absent class until after
certification).
68 See generally Russell Gold, Compensation’s Reputational Role in Class Action Deter-
rence (Oct. 10–11, 2014).
69 See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91
VA. L. REV. 1721, 1727 (2005) (stating that “on average, it costs approximately one dollar in
legal expenses for the legal system to transfer one dollar from a defendant to a plaintiff,”
even in settlement); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997)
(“The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly summarized: dockets
in both federal and state courts continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too
long; the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims’
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substantial zone of potential agreement, in which the corporation and the
victim can both not only receive the full net expected value of the aggregate
litigation, but then split the remaining monies that are avoided through liti-
gation costs and losses.  In other words, private mass settlement has the abil-
ity to consistently offer a simultaneously superior outcome for both the
would-be defendant and would-be plaintiffs.
C. Closure Without Adjudication?
One of the biggest drawbacks of private funds is of course the lack of
closure relative to public aggregation.  Class actions—despite their costs to
defendants—at least offer the promise of nearly complete closure; the class
settlement precludes suit by the entire class, leaving only the handful of vic-
tims that opt out as litigation risks.  MDL—because of its opt-in nature—only
offers closure as to the individuals that accept the settlement.  Yet, if the com-
pany is able to obtain a global settlement of the MDL and parallel state court
actions, this usually entices all individuals who will ultimately pursue litiga-
tion to come forward—and statute of limitations issues will likely bar those
who do not with respect to most types of claims.  Thus, whether formally or
informally, companies usually obtain a relatively high degree of closure
through the public aggregation mechanisms.
But, by their nature, bilateral settlements have no ability to bind or pre-
clude any other party; thus, the conventional wisdom goes, closure is limited
to the handful of individuals who accept the settlement.  This section chal-
lenges this critique of private settlement funds, arguing that a more nuanced
analysis reveals more subtle bases for closure than have been heretofore
identified.
1. Informal Quasi-Closure Mechanisms
Because these mass settlement offers are made directly to individuals
without class certification, they do not bind any victims other than those who
expressly accept the offer.  Thus, victims who choose not to accept the settle-
ment are not precluded from bringing subsequent suit.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, high participation rates can have the
effect of practically creating closure.  As participation rates increase, the
number of victims with actionable claims decreases.  As this occurs, the
extent to which the costs of litigation can be spread across plaintiffs—
whether in a class action or an MDL—decreases.  Just as only large-value
claims can be viably prosecuted by opt-out class members, so too as participa-
tion rates increase, the ability of victims to pursue litigation decreases.  This
likewise comports with the initial impetus for Rule 23(b)(3), which recog-
nized that many harms are not individually viable but instead require aggre-
gation to incentivize an attorney to bring the claim.
recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and
future claimants may lose altogether.” (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra
note 29, 2–3) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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For companies offering bilateral mass settlements, a high participation
rate may thus disincentivize the filing of aggregate litigation, effectively insu-
lating them from a class action even if only a portion of the class accepts the
offer.  For participants, these programs often provide full or even super-com-
pensation.70  For defendants, the litigation cost savings and elimination of
free riding allow a decreased net outlay.  Together, this creates a situation in
which both parties are better off.  But, this comes at the expense of the pub-
lic—both the nonparticipating, would-be absent class members and the gen-
eral public interest in private enforcement of rights.71  This raises
fundamental questions about what normative outcomes our system should
prefer, to the extent that modern mechanisms are able to disaggregate com-
pensation and deterrence.
2. Formal Quasi-Closure Mechanisms
Bilateral mass settlements cannot preclude any nonparticipating victims
from filing claims for individual relief, nor from requesting joinder or an
MDL of these individual cases where procedurally appropriate.  But these
procedural maneuvers operate on a functionally opt-in basis, as they can only
adjudicate claims that have been filed by individuals—they cannot capture
the massive number of no-action victims.  Thus, the ability to file a class
action in the shadow of a bilateral settlement becomes a substantial factor in
determining the damages at stake.
A number of recent cases have begun to suggest an emerging doctrine as
to the extent to which the offer of a bilateral mass settlement can preclude
later certification of a class action.  In Aqua Dots, the Seventh Circuit held
that “[a] representative who proposes that high transaction costs (notice and
attorneys’ fees) be incurred at the class members’ expense to obtain a refund
that already is on offer is not adequately protecting the class members’ inter-
ests.”72  In addition, arguments have been advanced that, where these settle-
ments offer full compensation, certification would be inconsistent with the
70 One exemplar of this approach lays in the NFL’s response to the seating shortage at
the Dallas Cowboys’ stadium during the 2011 Super Bowl.  Notwithstanding the price paid
and limitations on liability contained in the contract, the defendants offered those tick-
etholders who were denied seats a choice of: (a) a ticket to the 2012 Super Bowl plus
$2400; (b) a ticket to any future Super Bowl, including airfare and a four-night hotel stay;
or (c) the greater of $5000, or actual ticket price paid, travel, lodging, and meal expenses
(with accompanying receipts). See Dodge, supra note 18, at 1279.  For additional discus-
sion of this settlement offer and other super-compensation offers, see id.
71 See Mullenix, supra note 24, at 3–6.
72 In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011).
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adequacy, superiority, and manageability requirements,73 and may even
render injunctive claims moot.74
As Judge Easterbrook noted, the “substantial costs of the legal process”
offered little value as “plaintiffs could have had refunds—and still can have
them today.”75  Moreover, as he went on to note, there was little reason to
believe that the court’s notice campaign would be more effective than that of
the corporation—most consumers had returned the product, there were no
complaints by the governing agency, and it was likely that many of the unre-
turned products had been used prior to the recall.76
In contrast, in the BP MDL the court granted certification of a tagalong
class action.77  In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP created
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility to process the claims of victims of the oil
spill.78  BP framed the GCCF as a full compensation fund; it would pay out at
a 100% rate for all damages recognized by the fund’s administrators.79  Its
selection of a full payout rate provided a preliminary assurance to potential
claimants that so long as the administrator properly determines the claims
payable, they should receive the greatest possible compensation for their
losses—free of the allocational error, diminution for attorneys’ fees and
costs, and delay inherent to the class action system.  This substantive promise
of full compensation combined with the procedural structure and selection
73 See, e.g., Waller v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 295 F.R.D. 472, 488 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (sum-
marizing the caselaw on voluntary settlement offers as destroying adequacy and superiority
and finding that that class action was not superior due in part to alternative remedial mea-
sures available to the plaintiffs); see also Pagan v. Abbott Labs., 287 F.R.D. 139, 151
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[R]ational class members would not choose to litigate a multiyear class
action just to procure refunds that are readily available here and now.” (quoting In re Aqua
Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 377, 383 (N.D. Ill. 2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Webb v. Carter’s Inc., 272 F.R.D. 489, 504–05 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that the
class action was not superior because “because [Defendant] is already offering the very
relief that Plaintiffs seek,” namely, refunds and out-of-pocket medical costs for treating skin
irritation); In re PPA Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 622 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (stating
that, because defendants maintained refund and product replacement programs for indi-
viduals still in possession of products, “[i]t makes little sense to certify a class where a class
mechanism is unnecessary to afford the class members redress”).
74 See Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2012)
(stating that the voluntary recall filed with the applicable government agency rendered
moot a class action because the recall had already provided the entire remedy to which the
class members would be entitled); see also Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.3d
289, 293–94 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing a variety of ways that class actions may not protect
the interests of the class).
75 In re Aqua Dots, 654 F.3d at 751.
76 Id.
77 Order and Reasons at 36, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F.
Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012).
78 Although BP would ultimately reach a class action settlement approved in 2012, BP
resolved more than two thirds of its claims—more than $7.8 billion, see Robertson &
Schwartz, supra note 13, through a private claim resolution facility required by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012).
79 See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 33, at 399–402.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 19  8-DEC-14 14:51
2014] privatizing  mass  settlement 353
of Kenneth Feinberg—the 9/11 Fund administrator—enhanced the legiti-
macy and perception of fairness for some claimants.
Yet, substantial questions arose about the legitimacy of this fund.  While
some heralded the GCCF as a superior mechanism for getting money to vic-
tims when they needed it most, others decried it as an illegitimate system,
crafted by a defendant who, they posited, had the ability to control Feinberg
and elicit favorable determinations.  Indeed, the difficulty in deciding how to
value damages for businesses that were already in the midst of a recession led
to complex legal determinations.  As Linda Mullenix described it,
The serious challenges that scholars have raised with regard to the legit-
imacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund have even more
powerful resonance in relation to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. . . . For
those concerned with the rule of law, equity, and fundamental fairness, the
GCCF ought to be a cause for concern.80
The Department of Justice (DOJ) confirmed her intuitions of systemic
bias, finding that in its audit of the tribunal’s awards, the average claimant
received $8,800 less than the independent reviewers determined to be due,
triggering aggregate payments of more than $64 million.81
Against this backdrop, the court noted that substantial questions had
been raised about whether the private settlement fund was awarding the full
amount of compensation that victims might receive in litigation, or instead
whether systemic features were resulting in undercompensation in the
award—despite the facial offer of full compensation.82  As a result, it granted
certification of the class and approval of the settlement, replacing the GCCF
with a court-approved class action settlement for medical and economic dam-
ages claims as part of the Deepwater Horizon MDL.83
Under this emerging doctrine, if the compensation offered by the bilat-
eral settlement is equal to the greatest possible recovery in the class action,
the class cannot be certified.  But, if the putative class representative can
establish that the settlement offer does not provide the full value of compen-
sation available in a class action, then the class may be certified notwithstand-
ing the settlement offer.84  For companies that expect a low participation
rate, making an overly generous offer allows the company to avoid class certi-
fication—with its de facto mandatory class and resulting increase in dam-
80 Mullenix, supra note 54, at 825.
81 BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY 1
(Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/697201241917226
179477.pdf (noting total fund payout of over $6.2 billion to more than 220,000 claimants).
82 See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 941
(E.D. La. 2012).
83 Id. at 964.
84 See, e.g., In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 2010) (uphold-
ing certification where class settlement obtained relief beyond refund); Jovel v. Boiron,
Inc., No. 11-cv-10803-SVW-SHx, 2014 WL 1027874, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014) (grant-
ing certification where time period varied from private refund programs); Waller v. Hew-
lett-Packard Co., 295 F.R.D. 472, 488 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (granting certification where no
refund offer was made and noting that this made it distinguishable from In re Aqua Dots).
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ages.85  But, perhaps equally important, it avoids the costs and discovery risks
of litigating to class certification, as bilateral mass settlements can be used to
simply strike the class allegations of the claim.  In contrast, where the dam-
ages are highly individualized or variable, it becomes more difficult to estab-
lish that the payments made are clearly superior to a class action, without
paying more than the value obtained by avoiding the aggregate
proceeding.86
To be clear, this emerging doctrine does not require that this offer
represent all possible remedies and compensation.  Rather, the requirement
is only that the offer represents the maximum available within a class action.
Thus, to the extent that certain damages cannot be pursued within the class
action—for example, state law claims in a nationwide class action, punitive
damages, or the claims of future claimants—these need not be paid by the
bilateral settlement to bar class litigation.87  For defendants, this may add
further value to a bilateral mass settlement, as it creates functional closure as
to not only those compensatory damages paid but even related claims, like
punitive damages or state law damages, that were not paid.
* * *
Despite the grassroots popularity of these programs, substantial norma-
tive questions remain.  While theoretically both parties should be better off
through streamlining, the capacity for defendants to extract low-value settle-
ments from unrepresented victims raises substantial normative concerns with
respect to both compensation and deterrence.  Part II turns to the concerns
about actual compensation in privatized mass settlements.
II. IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW
Having challenged the conventional wisdom suggesting parties should
not participate in these settlements in Part I, this Part analyzes the risks these
settlements pose.  While scholars have commonly identified risks to victims,
85 For an interesting discussion, see Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs
and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513539##.
86 In some cases, courts have even denied certification notwithstanding the presence
of potential hypothetical class members that could theoretically receive more through liti-
gation than the private settlement offer—where the vast majority of the class are fully com-
pensated—apparently recognizing that the perfect could become the enemy of the good
where a single hypothetical plaintiff could subvert the entire settlement’s closure. See, e.g.,
Daigle v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-3214 (MJD/LIB), 2012 WL 3113854, at *5–6 (D. Minn.
July 31, 2012) (“Ford does acknowledge that there may be class members that paid to have
the entire transmission replaced, and who may not be fully reimbursed because replace-
ment of the entire transmission is not required to repair the defective torque converter.
Despite the possibility that certain class members will not be fully reimbursed through the
recall, the Court nonetheless finds that the recall weighs against a finding that a class
action is a superior method of adjudication of the claims asserted in this case.”).
87 See, e.g., In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752–53 (7th Cir. 2011).
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this discussion first extends the literature by arguing that the risks and bene-
fits of these settlements are not unidirectional but are instead bidirectional.
This Part then assesses the companion argument that, even assuming argu-
endo that fair compensation is offered, the claimants will receive less than
they would in an MDL class action.
A. Bidirectional Errors in Compensation in Private Funds
Understanding the impetus for privatization, the potential for win-win
compensation funds, and the factors that drive formal and informal closure
allows for a more careful consideration of the strategic dynamics that bilat-
eral mass settlements generate.  Contrary to the existing literature on these
mechanisms,88 this Section argues that bidirectional dislocations exist and
identifies the impact of the competing pressure of shifting compensation
away from the value of the expected legal recovery.  Indeed, while bypassing
the merits determination is rational for the parties, it creates a lack of preci-
sion in determining actual damages.  At the extreme, both innocent and
guilty parties may find it cheaper to pay full damages to those who file claims
in a private proceeding than to proceed through class certification and sum-
mary judgment.
While these problems of nuisance litigation are well-documented in the
context of class actions as well, this Section posits that they are more extreme
in the bilateral settlement context.  In class actions or MDLs, an innocent
defendant should be able to negotiate a smaller settlement than a guilty
defendant by persuading class counsel of the weaknesses of the case on the
merits.  But, in the bilateral mass settlement context, there is no single agent
to negotiate with on behalf of the plaintiff; therefore, guilty and innocent
parties may pay substantially equal amounts to obtain plaintiffs’ participation.
While bearing the risk of an inaccurate settlement is a rational decision
for the parties, it closes the differential between the two competing states of
compliance and noncompliance with the law.  As this differential creates the
deterrent value a given law possesses, the lack of merits-based determinations
in disaggregated settlements may weaken the goal of not just compensation,
but also deterrence.
This Section identifies and develops the potential sources of this inaccu-
racy in compensation, arguing that the dysfunction is far more complex than
identified in the existing literature.
1. Pro-Plaintiff Sources of Error
Scholars have generally concluded that mass settlement offers made uni-
laterally by the defendant will favor the defendant, offering less compensa-
tion to plaintiffs than would be available in litigation.89  Yet, the reality on the
88 See supra Section I.B.
89 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 54, at 376; Mullenix, supra note 54, at 825; Judith Resnik,
Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 161–68 (2011).
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ground is far different.  Corporations are frequently making offers of full
compensation, and in many cases are even offering a premium beyond the
best possible result in litigation.  For example, when Hyundai discovered that
some of its cars actually obtained 26 miles per gallon instead of 27 miles per
gallon,90 it not only offered consumers a full reimbursement of these addi-
tional fuel costs for the life of their ownership, but also a 15% premium to
cover any inconvenience—a premium not available by law.91  When a class
action was later filed on the same grounds, the lump sum payment option
negotiated by class counsel92 offered only a fraction of this recovery for plain-
tiffs.93  Likewise, when Super Bowl ticket holders were either relocated or
denied seats altogether due to construction and permitting delays at the new
Dallas Cowboys’ stadium, most legal analysts concluded that the ticket hold-
ers were entitled to traditional contract damages.94  Yet, the NFL made a
more generous offer to each of the affected classes.95  This subection ana-
lyzes the structural factors presented by mass settlement offers that may drive
90 Voluntary Fuel Economy Adjustment, HYUNDAI (Nov. 2, 2012), https://hyundaimpginfo
.com/news/details/hyundai-and-kia-initiate-voluntary-program-to-adjust-fuel-economy-rat
ings.  The incongruity in the fuel economy rating was the result of procedural errors made
during so-called “coastdown” testing at Hyundai and Kia’s joint testing facility in South
Korea. Id.
91 Jaclyn Trop, Hyundai Expands Choices in Gas Mileage Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/business/hyundai-expands-choices-in-gas-
mileage-settlement.html.  The mileage formula has four components: “(1) 2012 average
fuel prices for the Hyundai owner’s geographic area; (2) mileage accrued by the owner;
(3) change in combined (city/highway) EPA estimates for the vehicle; and (4) the fuel
grade (regular or premium) recommended for the vehicle.” Hyundai Reimbursement Pro-
gram Facts, HYUNDAI (Nov. 2, 2012), https://hyundaimpginfo.com/resources/details/
hyundai-reimbursement-program-facts/.
92 Jerry Hirsch, Hyundai, Kia Reach $400-Million Settlement over Inflated MPG Claims, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/23/autos/la-fi-hy-hyundai-kia-
settle-mpg-lawsuit-20131223.
93 According to the Kelley Blue Book, a study conducted by global market intelligence
firm R.L. Polk & Co. indicates that Americans keep their new cars for an average of 71.4
months (or 5.95 years). Average Length of U.S. Vehicle Ownership Hit an All-Time High, KELLEY
BLUE BOOK (Feb. 23, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.kbb.com/car-news/all-the-latest/aver
age-length-of-us-vehicle-ownership-hit-an-all_time-high/2000007854.  In addition, accord-
ing to the Federal Highway Administration, Americans between the ages of 20 and 34 drive
an average of 15,098 miles annually. Licensed Drivers, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p4.htm.  Based upon these average inputs, a
Gulf Coast customer who keeps her Tucson for 5.95 years and drives an average of 15,098
miles per year, using current gas prices will recover a total of $542.94.  A West Coast con-
sumer who does the same will receive $624.93.  Thus, depending upon geographic adjust-
ment, the reimbursement will range between $542–625; in contrast, the class counsel
negotiated only $353 in a lump sum payment.  Hirsch, supra note 92.
94 See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 16.
95 The NFL offered a tiered compensation structure, which each ticketholder could
choose to accept in lieu of litigation.  The 2000 ticketholders who were delayed or were
relocated could choose (a) the face value of their ticket, or (b) a ticket to a future Super
Bowl.  The approximately 400 ticketholders that did not receive any seat were given two
options to select between: (a) $2400 plus a ticket to the 2012 Super Bowl, which they could
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-DEC-14 14:51
2014] privatizing  mass  settlement 357
corporations to offer terms that are objectively in excess of the legally availa-
ble remedies.
Private mass settlement offers generate substantial net gains through the
elimination of contested litigation and, in turn, plaintiffs’ counsel.  On one
level, this streamlining would seem to be highly efficient: in most cases, the
defendant is in the best position to know whether it perpetrated the alleged
wrong or not.  Likewise, the victim typically has superior information as to his
or her particular injuries and damages.  There are, of course, exceptions, but
most litigation follows this model.  It would therefore seem that the defen-
dant has the capacity to decide whether it anticipates a finding of liability or
not, sufficient to drive its decision to make a mass settlement offer.  Likewise,
confronted with that offer, the victim would seem to be able to assess whether
the compensation offered is equal to or greater than the damages suffered.
Given this litigation structure, private mass settlement can bypass the costs of
litigation in most cases, because while neither party has full information,
each has the specific information necessary to make or accept an offer.
But this streamlining substantially reshapes not just discovery, but the
settlement process more broadly.  In the aggregate litigation context, plain-
tiffs’ counsel conducts an inquiry into the defendant’s liability and assesses
damages.  The plaintiffs’ attorney can then provide an assessment of the fair-
ness of any proposed settlement offer including advising and educating cli-
ents about their legal rights.  In contrast, private mass settlement offers are
typically designed to operate without counsel.96  As a result, there is no indi-
vidual who can perform these functions.  In the absence of a legal assessment
of the settlement offer, victims are largely left to rely on their own subjective
perceptions of fairness.  This shift in the nature of the settlement decision
gives rise to a number of insights about the conditions for settlement—and
potential for error.
First, unilateral mass settlement offers may yield low participation rates
where potential claimants cannot accurately ascertain the compensation to
which they are legally entitled without the aid of counsel.  In these cases
where information is low, cognitive biases are most likely to operate—leading
individuals to overestimate the strength of their own position and to reac-
tively devalue any proposal made by the corporation.97  In contrast, in cases
use or sell in the secondary market; or (b) a ticket to a future Super Bowl, including airfare
and a four-night hotel stay. See id.
While the court would be limited to the contractual damages available, the offer of
tickets to a future Super Bowl of the ticketholder’s choosing created an offer objectively
superior to any potentially available in court. See id.  Not only did the NFL offer a subjec-
tive value for plaintiffs given the difficulty in obtaining tickets for a particular Super Bowl,
but also an enhanced objective value given the secondary market premium on tickets. See
id.
96 See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7, 14), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2414754.
97 See Pianigiani, supra note 15 (highlighting consumer group’s outright rejection of a
settlement offer based on the belief it was too low).
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in which damages are relatively objective, even laypersons can relatively accu-
rately predict the compensation available by law.98  Unilateral settlement
offers made for claims whose value individuals can easily determine and com-
pare are therefore less likely to suffer from legitimacy concerns or a belief
that the defendant is undercompensating through the claims fund.
Second, the lack of plaintiffs’ counsel can prevent the effective educa-
tion of potential claimants about either potential merits defenses or limita-
tions upon damages.  In the traditional public aggregation mechanisms of
class actions and MDL, the defendant is able to bargain with plaintiffs’ coun-
sel to diminish the amount of settlement based upon the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.  But risk premiums and risk discounts require an
understanding of the legal arguments and resulting bargaining process.  Yet,
the nature of bilateral mass settlement offers functions as a one-way ratchet,
preventing this education from occurring.
Consider the Costa Concordia, which shipwrecked off the Italian coast
resulting in a loss of property, out-of-pocket transportation costs, and psycho-
logical harm to the surviving passengers.99  The cruise line immediately
issued a bilateral mass settlement offer.100  The cruise line attempted to
explain that it had provided generous compensation relative to litigation,
given a combination of forum selection provisions, procedural barriers, and
damages caps, which together made the offer a fair estimate of what victims
would obtain.101  Indeed, in an attempt to build legitimacy for the offer, the
company even bargained with nonprofit consumer groups about the offer’s
terms.102
But, what message did the victims receive?  Any plaintiff’s attorney who
believed the offer was fair had no incentive to invest in the case; the settle-
ment was already on offer.  Only those attorneys who believed that the deal
was unfair had an incentive to appear on the dock, attempting to sway pas-
sengers that the courts would not enforce the contractual waivers the passen-
gers had agreed to and would instead permit a class action.  Given the trends
in Supreme Court doctrine, the probability of success on such a claim was
objectively quite low.  Yet, the message to the victims was quite different—
every plaintiff’s attorney lobbying for his business was arguing that these pro-
visions would not be enforced.  Indeed, they had to—no reasonable plain-
tiff’s attorney would solicit business with the claim that he would obtain less
than what was already on offer.  Thus, even if only 1% of plaintiffs’ attorneys
98 In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that
60% of the one million affected toys were returned for a full refund).
99 See Pianigiani, supra note 15.
100 Id.
101 See Costa Cruises Details Costa Concordia Guest Reimbursement, CRUISE RADIO (Jan. 27,
2012), http://cruiseradio.net/costa-cruises-details-costa-concordia-guest-reimbursement/.
102 See Barbie Latza Nadeau, Why Survivors Aren’t Buying Costa Concordia’s Compensation
Offer, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/27/
why-survivors-aren-t-buying-costa-concordia-s-compensation-offer.html (describing survi-
vors’ reasons for hiring counsel for a class action lawsuit rather than accepting the settle-
ment offer).
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took this view, they still represented 100% of those soliciting the passengers’
business.  Against this seemingly unanimous message, the defendant’s legal
arguments likely seemed hollow and self-serving.  Indeed, it may thus be
unsurprising that the Concordia settlement struggled to obtain participation,
even though it had been negotiated with consumer groups in an attempt to
gain this elusive legitimacy.103
Third, as foreshadowed by the previous example, unilateral settlement
offers are most likely to be effective for midsized claims: small-value claims
will have payout offers so small that few participants are willing to apply for
compensation, while large-value claims may incentivize would-be plaintiffs’
counsel to take a public stance in opposition to the deal, suggesting that they
can obtain superior compensation.
Implicit in this discussion is the recognition that, while these structural
features can act as barriers to settlement, they can also shift the substantive
content of the settlement offer.  Sophisticated defendants are increasingly
realizing that offering super-compensation can increase perceptions of legiti-
macy and, in turn, goodwill and participation rates.  Because of the high
costs of litigation, companies can offer relatively enhanced compensation
without exceeding the anticipated costs of litigation and settlement in the
public aggregation system.104
Not only can high litigation costs drive defendants to make mass settle-
ment offers for amounts in excess of the maximum amount that may be
awarded in litigation, but even to make offers on claims that they believe are
meritless.  Mass settlement offers are designed to decrease litigation costs,
often through a defendant conceding liability on a particular substantive
issue.  Such a concession is rational where the defendant believes it is likely to
be found guilty, such that the continuation of litigation is unlikely to yield a
decrease in liability, but will certainly generate additional costs.  But, it can
also result where the substantive issue is one whose determination is likely to
cost more than the liability at stake—making it a negative-value defense.
Indeed, companies are now routinely offering recall and refund provisions
on claims that may seem objectively dubious in order to take advantage of
Aqua Dots closure.105
This use of unilateral mass settlement offers is entirely rational for the
defendant: a class action will presumptively include all consumers who have
purchased the product in question, and will require expensive litigation on
either the merits, class certification, or both.  In contrast, making an offer of
a full refund effectively converts the claims to opt-ins, such that only the
handful—or more likely one—complaining consumer can be paid a compar-
atively small sum.  In this manner, it should effectively deter the filing of
frivolous class action suits.
Yet, as companies begin to offer mass settlements for harms that have
not even been complained of, it suggests a powerful dysfunction within our
103 See id.
104 See supra Part I.
105 See Nadeau, supra note 102.
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aggregate litigation system.  One might interpret this as a pro-consumer
development, as companies are now proactively identifying and offering rem-
edies for harms.  But, to the extent that companies are paying substantial
sums to settle claims that are without legal basis, it diminishes the gap
between complying and not complying with the law.  Since deterrence is a
function of the anticipated difference in outcome the potential wrongdoer
will obtain if it violates or does not violate the law, over-enforcement of the
law against innocent parties can diminish deterrence.
This leads to a powerful normative observation.  Bilateral mass settle-
ments have typically been criticized as permitting defendants to inflict exter-
nalities upon society by evading payment to nonparticipating claimants.  But
this analysis suggests a far more complex picture.  To the extent that bilateral
mass settlements permit defendants to deter the filing of frivolous litigation,
they enhance deterrence and improve the enforcement of law.  Moreover,
while purely privatized settlement offers have typically been characterized as
tools to undercompensate victims, there are powerful structural pressures
toward overcompensation.
2. Pro-Defendant Sources of Error
Despite the theoretical potential for an equitable division of the joint
gains derived from the efficiencies of bilateral mass settlement, bargaining
power or procedural structures may drive a different allocation.  As described
above, many unilateral mass settlement offers have included super-compensa-
tion to plaintiffs, relative to the expected outcome in public aggregation, as a
mechanism for enhancing participation given the trepidation of victims
about the fairness of these offers.  However, as mass settlement offers gain
increased acceptance and legitimacy, this premium may decrease.  Indeed,
both the September 11 Fund106 and the BP GCCF107 obtained the participa-
tion of individuals who received awards less than those available under tort
law.
This suggests an alternate possibility: that defendants may be able to
deploy the efficiencies gained by settlement to reduce the payout of compen-
satory damages—shifting the division of joint gains in favor of the defendant.
When one considers attorneys’ fees, related litigation costs, and the time
value of money, even an offer of compensation at a rate of 70% would be
objectively superior to the net value of litigation.  When one accounts for the
risk of litigation, the necessity of a quick payout to pay medical bills or com-
pensate for lost income, as well as personal preferences for immediate pay-
ment, this partial payout might be accepted at an even lower rate.108
106 See FEINBERG, supra note 55.
107 BDO CONSULTING, supra note 81, at 2 (finding that in its audit of the tribunal’s
awards, the average claimant received less than the independent reviewers determined to
be due, triggering aggregate payments of more than $64 million).
108 See Dodge, supra note 18, at 1302–06.
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In the context of mass claims, as some victims begin to accept a settle-
ment, this increases the pressure on others to accept the terms—a dynamic I
term “the tyranny of settlement.”109  Essentially, as plaintiffs begin to settle
their claims, they constrict the pool of individuals across whom costs can be
spread.  As the costs of litigation increase, this causes the settlement to
become a superior option to the net expected outcome in litigation.  As
these individuals accept the settlement, the pattern continues, continuing to
diminish the benefit of aggregation for those who do not accept the
settlement.
When one considers that the administrative costs and recoveries of mass
tort cases hovers around a 2:3 ratio,110 and in some cases legal fees and costs
actually exceed compensation,111 the extent of potential distortion becomes
clear.  Once a settlement gains traction among some plaintiffs—perhaps
those in the most desperate financial circumstances—it can induce others to
settle for only a small fraction of the claim’s value.112  This potential spiral
would not only impair the compensation of the victims, but also the extent to
which deterrence is effectuated.
Of course, if a company offered such an explicit fractional compensa-
tion to victims, it would likely be rejected by most as an insult or injustice out
of a simple sense of fairness.  Moreover, to the extent that the harm was one
that had caused secondary effects, as victims remained hospitalized and were
unable to work, and then were being pressured to accept settlements to feed
their families or to avoid foreclosure, the media would likely be quick to pub-
licize the victims’ stories.
But, what if it were not so blatant?  Claims valuation is often a complex
endeavor, as exemplified by the litigation surrounding not only the BP
GCCF, but also the court-approved MDL class settlements that succeeded
it.113  Private mass settlements have historically operated as unilateral offers
of compensation made by the corporate defendant to the victims.  This
places defendants in the role of both the settlement drafter and the systems
designer.114
As the settlement’s author, the defendant must decide the eligibility
requirements for participation.115  While some cases have self-evident con-
tours, more often there are complex questions about who should be eligible
109 See Jaime Dodge, The Tyranny of Settlement: Recapturing the Promise of Multi-
District Litigation 2, 3, 11–24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
110 See Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE
L.J. 813, 820–21 (1989) (collecting studies and reviewing PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE
ON TRIAL (1987)).
111 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (noting that the
transaction costs were exceeding recovery in the asbestos cases by a 2:1 ratio).
112 See Dodge, supra note 109, at 20–24.
113 For a discussion of the complexity of claims valuation, see CPR INST., CPR MASTER
GUIDE TO MASS CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITIES 19–50 (2010).
114 For a discussion of the role of dispute systems designers, see NANCY H. ROGERS ET
AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES (2013).
115 See CPR INST., supra note 113, at 71–78.
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for compensation.  This is particularly true where there are indirect harms,
zones of harm, or even near-misses triggering psychological trauma and survi-
vor guilt.116  Will the contours be driven purely by cognizable legal claims, or
will the company recognize others whom equity might suggest should receive
some compensation?  In drawing these lines, the defendant may well decide
to create certain presumptions of harm for individuals meeting certain crite-
ria, recognizing that the cost of an individual inquiry would likely outstrip the
benefit of identifying a few weak claims.
But this also presents a tactical opportunity.  If the line is carefully
drawn, the settlement should attract the participation of the highest-value
claims.  This may leave a subset of claims with weaker merits or low-value
claims, disincentivizing plaintiffs’ lawyers from taking up these claims.
In these roles, the defendant also has the opportunity to define the crite-
ria for compensation.  In creating the GCCF, BP elected not to exercise this
power, but instead to allow the special master, Kenneth Feinberg, to set the
terms.  In creating the compensation structure, Feinberg consulted with
prominent scholars in making a variety of difficult decisions, for example,
whether to offset replacement income and how to value future risk (as the
settlement was a final settlement of all claims).117  Yet, he and BP still came
under attack for the compensation structure, arguing that it was intended to
undercompensate victims.118  The controversy only became worse when the
DOJ issued a report documenting an underpayment of claims of $64 million;
although, one must take this number in the context of $6.2 billion being
paid to more than 220,000 claimants.119
This is not to say that corporate defendants will exploit victims, inten-
tionally or otherwise.  Rather, the key observation is simply that bilateral mass
settlements are highly malleable devices, which can be used to obtain a broad
array of outcomes.  Indeed, the next Part takes up the question of how
defendants can most effectively utilize these settlements—and their limits.
Contrary to the widespread scholarly assumption that corporations will
delay settlement for as long as possible, litigating even low probability
motions, corporations are regularly offering victims of mass claims full com-
116 See Richard Blackburn & Lindsay Murdoch, Malaysia Airlines Disaster: How Much Is a
Passenger Worth?, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/world/
malaysia-airlines-disaster-how-much-is-a-passenger-worth-20140327-zqn9o.html.  The recent
fund established to aid the families of the victims of the Malaysian Air Flight 371, which was
blown up in flight over Ukraine, exemplifies this line drawing, as it provides assistance to
the families of those that were killed, but does not provide compensation to those that
were booked on the flight but then bumped off the flight.  Yet, some of these survivors
clearly have the capacity to experience substantial psychological harm beyond merely the
loss of their loved one: whether it is the mother that told her son to fly despite his premoni-
tion the plane would crash, or his brother who was bumped from the flight that then
claimed the lives of his two younger brothers.
117 See FEINBERG, supra note 55.
118 Mullenix, supra note 54, at 825.
119 BDO CONSULTING, supra note 81, at 1 (noting total fund payout of over $6.2 billion
to more than 220,000 claimants).
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pensation outside of the litigation process.120  These settlements offer a sub-
stantially more efficient mechanism for resolving claims, limiting the
transaction costs relative to traditional aggregation by upending the most
fundamental assumptions of our class action system.
B. Reconceptualizing the “Lesson of BP”
A second level of scholarly commentary suggests that, even assuming
arguendo that the private compensation fund pays out a reasonable level of
compensation, claimants and defendants should still prefer an MDL settle-
ment to a private claims fund.121  The argument is that victims are better off
because defendants pay more in damages, while defendants are better off
because they receive more closure—particularly in high-value cases like the
BP oil spill.122  But, is this always true?
I do not dispute the fundamentals on which these scholars rely—the
decreased litigation costs, mitigation of adverse selection problems, and ben-
efit of resolving the final “handful” of cases.123  But I question whether these
justify the extent of the premium suggested here, or whether something
more was at play.
1. The Traditional Conception of the Deepwater Horizon Funds
Issacharoff and Rave posit that there were three components of the
MDL peace premium that justified the enhanced settlement values relative to
the GCCF: decreasing litigation costs by settling in bulk, instead of through
individualized negotiations; reducing the risk of adverse selection, whereby
the individuals with the best claim opt-out of the settlement; and resolving all
claims, thereby avoiding the disproportionate costs the final holdouts can
impose upon a corporation.124  But does this explain the more generous
public settlement?
It is true that the MDL’s embedded class actions converted the claims
from de facto opt-in structures to opt-out Rule 23(b)(3) classes.  But, what
did this buy?  The GCCF had already processed $6.2 billion in payments to
220,000 claimants.  In contrast, only 3,016 cases have been filed in the
MDL.125
Against a backdrop of an existing claims fund and a running statute of
limitations, how many strong claims was BP buying peace as to?  Put another
120 See Eric P. Voigt, A Company’s Voluntary Refund Program for Consumers Can Be a Fair
and Efficient Alternative to a Class Action, 31 REV. LITIG. 617, 618–20 (2012).
121 See, e.g., Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 33, at 412–14 (arguing claimants receive
greater compensation, while defendants get greater closure).
122 See, e.g., id.
123 See id. at 414.
124 See id.
125 See MDL Statistics Report – Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by District, U.S. JUDICIAL
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/
jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-August-15-2014.pdf.
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way, how many individuals who had not filed in the GCCF nor already filed
lawsuits were likely to come forward before the statute of limitations expired?
Given this dynamic, the class settlement required BP to make payments calcu-
lated based upon a large number of claims that would never have been pur-
sued but for the class action device.
The claimants in the class action can be conceived in three basic catego-
ries: (1) those who, for whatever reason, did not file a claim before the GCCF
and also would not ultimately file in the Rule 23 action either—essentially
the “no action” absent class members; (2) those who did not trust the GCCF,
often because of its ties to BP or other questions of legitimacy, but would
participate in a Rule 23 settlement with similar terms negotiated at arm’s
length; and (3) the claimants who believed they were systemically undercom-
pensated by formulaic damages, and thus would opt out of both the private
and subsequent public suits.
Having disaggregated the potential claimants in this way, it becomes eas-
ier to conceptualize the limited role of adverse selection.  So long as the set-
tlement obtains final approval, BP would obtain peace as to the first category
of “no action” claimants.  Regardless of whether it paid the lower or higher
amount, these individuals would be in the class and precluded from subse-
quent litigation—but the victory would be rather hollow, since they would
never have filed claims in either system.  So too, the second group of claim-
ants, who merely wanted a legitimate, arms-length process for damages deter-
mination, will participate in the settlement at the lower or higher value.  For
clarification purposes, one might label these the procedural legitimacy/non-
opt-out class members—they will accept whatever terms are approved by class
counsel and the court.
It is only the third group of absent class members whose participation is
driven by the settlement’s terms.  But, because the same grid applies to all
claimants, in order to capture each additional absent class member in this
third, “potential opt-out” group, all claimants must receive these increasingly
favorable terms.  Put another way, to obtain the marginal participation
increase of those potential opt-outs who demand 1% more in payouts, the
no-action and procedural legitimacy class members will all also need to
receive the additional 1%.
But, opt-out rates are typically only 1 to 2% of the class.  Moreover, opt-
outs take all forms.  Some opt-outs are opting out of the litigation because
they effectively agree with the defendant that it should not be held liable for
the alleged harm.  Other opt-outs represent the opposite end of the spec-
trum, believing that the compensation on offer is too little.  Within this
group, each claimant choosing to opt out rationally must anticipate that the
underpayment under the Rule 23 settlement is substantial enough to justify
the litigation costs of proceeding, or that there will be enough individuals
who opt out to generate cost spreading sufficient to overcome this dynamic.
Finally, another set of opt-outs may seek alternative end-goals; for example,
wanting to continue discovery to bring to the public’s attention additional
details of the corporation’s wrongdoing.  Given this dynamic, only a portion
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of the potential opt-outs can be captured by a sweeter deal—those that favor
the company or who oppose any settlement will opt out under any terms.
Taken together, one must then ask whether increasing the payout struc-
ture was the best available approach to minimizing adverse selection.  It may
well be that in some cases, damages are clustered so closely that even paying
all claimants at the highest possible damage level is still less expensive than
litigating.  Indeed, this is the basic principle behind many of the private mass
settlement funds identified in this Article.  But, where the premium was paid
for claims in an area of uncertainty—as here—there is less cause to expect
that only a small increase in payout will markedly change the opt-out rate.  As
the payout demanded by holdouts increases in size, it becomes more costly to
extend this largesse throughout the entire absent class.
Moreover, because the GCCF had already paid a substantial number of
claims, the universe of potential filers was somewhat distorted.  Removing
those claims from the MDL pool inherently left a greater percentage of no-
action claims than would otherwise have existed.  Yet, these no-action claim-
ants were still included in the calculation of the fund, at the now-magnified
rate of the settlement premium.
At the extreme, the premium demanded by the final holdouts—even if
irrationally high—may be enough to incentivize the corporation to simply
accept the opt-outs.  But, if this is done, then the adverse selection and dis-
proportionate, final-holdout costs have not been eliminated by the more gen-
erous terms; they have merely been mitigated.
Recognizing the high costs and functional limits to the peace purchased
by BP, might there have been other factors that combined with these to
incentivize its more generous MDL settlement terms?
2. A Supplemental Public/Private Interaction Narrative
BP settled its economic loss and medical claims cases in March 2010, in
the shadow of the pending criminal charges, which were the largest in U.S.
history.126  Viewed in this context, BP’s settlement on the courthouse steps
may have been not simply about the victims’ claims, but about their collateral
effect on other public proceedings.  By settling with the victims, BP could
decrease any likelihood that the government would seek compensation on
behalf of private victims—as it has frequently done in recent years.  But,
more importantly given the procedural posture of the settlement, it removed
the uncompensated victim from the table as a symbol of BP’s wrongdoing.
And, it affirmatively allowed BP to argue that neither retributive nor correc-
tive justice required government regulators to seek the harshest possible pen-
alty against BP.  Instead, it could argue that while it had made mistakes, it
126 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress
Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/bp-exploration-and-production-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environ
mental.
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had already learned its lesson, had compensated victims—and even remote
potential victims—with extreme largesse, and was, in short, attempting to
make right its wrongs.  In this tale, generous compensation became the
lynchpin of proving remorse—and, in turn, demonstrating that draconian
regulatory terms were simply punitive rather than deterrent.
This alternative narrative explains the paradox of the BP settlement for
many.  As BP—and before it, Haliburton—have argued (if not demon-
strated) in their filings, there are persons being generously compensated
who may not have suffered any legally cognizable injury, while for others the
payments outstrip the actual harm suffered.  Why did BP agree to—and some
would say actually pushed for—this over-compensation in terms of both the
scope of the class and damages paid?  And, more perplexing, what drove BP’s
sudden change of heart, in which it suddenly began appealing the settlement
to which it had just consented, with the ink barely dry?127
One might argue that BP simply had bad lawyers, who did not realize
that this was the consequence of the settlement agreement until months after
the negotiations concluded and the claims processing was underway.  Given
restrictions on settlement talks for British corporations, there might be some
merit to the argument that talks were too hurried for robust reality testing
and thus there was a lack of a true consensus on what certain terms would
mean.  But, BP had hired many of the best lawyers in the nation and was
working with many of the leading settlement advisors, making it difficult to
believe that BP’s lawyers did not see the gaping holes in the settlement.
Indeed, many of the terms now complained of were expressly discussed in
the settlement talks and, after having the consequences pointed out, BP’s
attorneys expressly agreed to the terms.128  This suggests that the tale is not
purely one of incompetent lawyering as some have assumed.129
Removing this explanation, the story is not one in which BP did not
know what it was agreeing to pay to whom.  Instead, it is one in which BP
knowingly consented to participate in (at least some) largesse, desiring to
make the class as broad as legally possible even to the point of paying com-
pensation to what it regards as non-victims.  And then, it suddenly changed
course.
If the story was one of closure, the change we would expect to see would
be that BP faced higher opt-out rates than anticipated, such that it did not
receive closure.  But, the record does not suggest that the opt-out rate was
127 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, BP Plays Twister in Latest Deepwater Horizon Appellate Brief,
REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/09/03/bp-plays-
twister-in-latest-deepwater-horizon-appellate-brief/.
128 See Brief for Appellees at 14–22, In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.
2014) (No. 13-30315) (detailing the meetings at which the terms and issues contested by
BP on appeal had been raised during the fall of 2012, prior to the fairness hearing for the
settlement).
129 For an early rejection of the notion “that BP and Kirkland & Ellis . . . were somehow
hoodwinked by plaintiffs lawyers,” see Alison Frankel, BP, Buyer’s Remorse and the Future of
Mass Tort Settlements, REUTERS (July 11, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/
2013/07/11/bp-buyers-remorse-and-the-future-of-mass-tort-settlements/.
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higher than would be anticipated for this type of case.  Moreover, if this was
an ex ante concern of BP’s, its sophisticated counsel knew how to draft par-
ticipation rate guarantees, and had done so in prior cases.  Thus, even if part
of the premium paid was for closure, it does not explain the change in course
by BP—and in turn, may suggest a different ex ante motivation for the deal.
One might alternatively posit, as BP has, that its change in stance was
instead about a special master with an undisclosed connection to plaintiffs
acting in disregard of the plain meaning of the contract’s terms.130  But, the
Fifth Circuit has agreed that the special master’s interpretations have been
wholly consistent with the settlement agreement’s terms, even if the settle-
ment itself provided compensation for individuals who did not have cogniza-
ble legal claims.  Moreover, setting aside the question of how the terms
should now be interpreted ex post given the language that was selected, the
terms in question are ones that sophisticated counsel could have drafted bet-
ter ex ante.131  Thus, this argument too appears to reduce to an argument
that BP’s counsel assumed that the special master would interpret the agree-
ment to have additional terms, rather than expressly stating them.  Given that
even first year law students are taught to put the terms in writing, leaving
nothing to chance, it may strain credulity for many to believe that none of
BP’s army of counsel thought better of this strategy.
But, does the timeline of BP’s change of heart suggest an alternative
theory?  Only months after the class action settlements, on November 15,
2012, the DOJ announced that BP had “agreed to plead guilty to felony man-
slaughter, environmental crimes and obstruction of Congress and pay a
record $4 billion in criminal fines and penalties for its conduct leading to the
2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.”132  Less than two weeks later, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) suspended BP and its affiliates from enter-
ing into any new government contracts—expressly relying on its plea deal
with the DOJ.133  The ban prevented BP, which held an estimated $2 billion
in federal fuel contracts, from obtaining new government contracts.134  But,
130 For an excellent summary of these claims, see id.
131 For example, while BP has now been relegated to arguing that it assumed that the
eligibility criteria would only be applied to those showing a legally cognizable injury, the
purpose of eligibility criteria is generally to serve as a proxy for legally cognizable injury.
Thus, if the proposed eligibility criteria was not a sufficient gate, sophisticated counsel
could well have added a term that the gate served as a mere presumption and that BP
could make an individual challenge to causation as to any claimant.
132 See Press Release, supra note 126.
133 See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, BP Temporarily Suspended from New
Contracts with the Federal Government (Nov. 28, 2012), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/79c090e81f0578738525781f0043619b/2aaf1c1dc80c969885257abf006dafb0!
OpenDocument.
134 See Alan Neuhauser, EPA to Lift Ban Barring BP from New Federal Contracts, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Mar. 13, 2014, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/03/13/epa-to-
lift-ban-barring-bp-from-new-federal-contracts (noting that experts saw the drop from “plus
$2 billion to minus $600 million” as unprecedented among federal contractors (internal
quotations omitted)).
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more critically, the ban prevented BP from entering into any new oil and gas
leases in the United States.135  Particularly devastating, this meant that BP
was not only losing a “crucial profit center” in the short term, but it was
losing potential new leases that were coming available—while it was prohib-
ited from bidding—to competitors like Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron.136
As late as the November 8, 2012 fairness hearing, BP had expressed no
reservations about the special master’s interpretation of the terms, even
though the special master had both expressly raised the issues that BP would
later challenge in theoretical terms and applied his understanding in
processing more than 79,000 claims, authorizing payments of more than $1.3
billion.137  Indeed, BP’s counsel even told the court that “Mr. Juneau . . . is
doing a wonderful job.”138  According to the special master, it was December
5, 2012—mere days after the EPA ban—that BP suddenly changed its pos-
ture, which it confirmed in writing on January 8, 2013.139
Given this timeline, there is a plausible argument that it was not only
closure vis-a`-vis the victims, but obtaining low cost closure with the govern-
ment that drove BP’s largesse.  As discussed in the prior section, because of
the prior GCCF, BP had already received partial closure.  Moreover, given
both the right of opting out and the continuing parallel litigation, even the
MDL settlement would not generate a global settlement or global peace.
But, reconceptualizing the settlement within this broader global litigation
framework helps explain why BP would pay such a premium for a settlement
that, for one-off reasons, was offering less closure than comparable class set-
tlements typically offer.
It also explains the sudden shift from pressing for a broader settlement
and advocating for its approval by the court to opposing the settlement and
appealing its implementation.140  In anticipation of the DOJ talks, BP may
have wanted to eliminate all potential private victims from the calculation in
order to limit not only the spectrum of actions and remedies available to
DOJ, but also to incentivize it to agree to more modest terms.  In its negotia-
tions with the DOJ, BP expected it was buying closure as to its public regula-
tory woes.141  By December, BP’s incentive toward generosity due to the
135 See Stanley Reed, BP Sues U.S. Over Contract Suspensions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/business/global/bp-sues-us-over-contract-suspen
sions.html?_r=0.
136 Id.
137 Brief for Appellees at 22, In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014)
(No. 13-30315).
138 Id. at 24.
139 Id. at 24–25.
140 As late as May 2012, BP agreed to a modification of the settlement agreements,
indicating its continued support for their terms. Cf. MDL-2179 Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deep-
water Horizon,” U.S. DIST. COURT, E. DIST. OF LA., http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/
oilspill.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2014).
141 Of course, just as the class settlement did not buy complete closure (but instead was
subject to the caveat of opt-outs), so too the DOJ settlement was not anticipated to buy
complete closure as to public claims.  For example, parallel state litigation remained pend-
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pending DOJ investigation had not only been removed, but it also discovered
that it had not obtained closure.  This alternative narrative suggests that the
problem in BP’s lawyering came not in the class settlement, but in the negoti-
ations with the federal government that followed.  And, indeed, it was pre-
cisely when these negotiations turned out badly for BP that it suddenly
shifted to a far more aggressive stance with the government and in the MDL,
ultimately culminating in its pending appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
At this point, it is impossible to know with certainty what happened in
the negotiating room or in the boardroom—and indeed, we may never
know.  But whatever the actual origins of the BP litigation strategy, we can
draw some insights about potential settlement paths and lessons.  Just as pri-
vate settlements can obtain a closure premium, so too, I posit that public
regulatory closure can also have disproportionate value such that it generates
a settlement premium.  The question then is how this premium should be
negotiated, how it is sequenced or intertwined with private rights of action,
and ultimately who should capture this premium.
It seems clear that we will see an increasing degree of interaction
between public and private enforcement in the coming years, such that the
public prosecution can influence the terms of private settlements and vice
versa.  In future cases, corporate defendants may attempt to negotiate for
increasing levels of global regulatory settlement, in which all government reg-
ulators and even attorneys general may be pressed to settle simultaneously—
for example, here ensuring that the EPA would not bring separate process
only days after and expressly relying upon the DOJ settlement.  Defendants
may also attempt to expressly link these public settlements with the private
ones, whether in a single settlement document or through informal
linkages.142
III. MASS SETTLEMENT AS STRATEGY
As noted in Part I, privatized mass settlements are typically initiated
through a unilateral offer of settlement, extended by the would-be corporate
defendant.  This Part thus turns to the potential uses of these settlements for
corporate defendants and articulates a structure for operationalizing a claims
settlement fund within each of these frameworks.  This Part concludes by
ing with respect to the harms to the Gulf States.  Rather, BP seemingly expected the DOJ
settlement would resolve its litigation with the federal government.
142 Such a condition might seek to preclude redundant litigation of a cause of action
for compensation that is tied to the individual victims’ harm but which may be pursued by
either the government or the victims directly.  In such a case, the waiver would simply
clarify the preclusive effect of the settlement with the private parties.  But the settlement
demand could also go further—expressly pitting the victims’ desire for payment now
against the public agency’s interest in conducting further investigation.  Or, the defendant
could make a truly global settlement offer inclusive of fines and penalties, as well as com-
pensation, stating that it would leave the allocation to the plaintiffs’ attorneys and govern-
ment officials.  In short, the opportunities for innovation in linkages in nearly endless, if
defendants follow this path.
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assessing the limitations of mass settlement offers, identifying particular vari-
ables that may limit the ability of the corporation to derive its desired out-
come—and thus the types of cases in which we might expect to see
comparatively limited use of privatized settlements.
A. Deterring the Nuisance Lawsuit?
The problem of nuisance lawsuits is one of paramount importance for
both in-house counsel and defense counsel.  The structure of the law inher-
ently forces corporations to spend substantial sums on defending even the
most spurious class actions.143  At a minimum, the company must bear the
costs of discovery and motions practice, culminating in summary judg-
ment.144  But this yields no closure beyond the putative named plaintiff.145
Thus, companies often instead choose to bear the substantial costs of pro-
ceeding through a class certification decision.  If the company prevails and
defeats class certification, it is still subject to individual litigation, but has at
least obtained a decision that will serve as a partial deterrent against future
class filings on the claim.146  If the company loses, it is now able to litigate its
summary judgment motion and have the outcome bind the entire class.147
In essence, the problem of nuisance lawsuits is that due process requires such
a high litigation cost to be borne before the case can fairly be dismissed.148
Private mass settlement offers have the capacity to solve the nuisance
lawsuit problem in a wide swath of cases.  These settlements are able to over-
come the procedural hurdles due process requires, which have heretofore
prevented efficient resolution of these cases.149  The first key to this solution
lies in returning autonomy to the victim.  Because the individual is empow-
143 Cf. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1378.
144 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he threat of
discovery expense [can] push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic [class
actions.]”).
145 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011) (stating that unless a class is
certified, the absent class members are not bound by either a formal class certification or
by any principle of virtual representation).
146 As the Supreme Court clarified in Smith v. Bayer Corp., a denial of class certification
is not binding on absent class members, and thus the judge cannot enjoin the pursuit of
class certification in another court.  However, while a federal judge is without power to
enjoin state court litigation, the Court did remind federal courts to apply the comity princi-
ple in order to avoid incentivizing repeat litigation of the class certification question. Id. at
2381–82; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
767 (7th Cir. 2003) (objecting to “an asymmetric system in which class counsel can win but
never lose” because of their ability to relitigate the issue of certification).
147 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing
certification as “forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a
single jury trial” or “to settle even if they have no legal liability” out of “fear of the risk of
bankruptcy”).
148 See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 1727.
149 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–58 (2011) (describing the
myriad protections that Rule 23, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Constitution provide to
protect both the defendant and absent class members alike).
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ered to decide whether to accept the offer, the procedural checks imposed
upon a class action are removed.  The second key lies in the closure mecha-
nism, which mandates fair compensation as a condition of closure.150  With
these two principles in mind, we can turn to how such a system could be
operationalized by a corporation.  Understanding what these systems would
look like then enables an analysis of the normative concerns implicated by
the likely pattern of operationalization.
1. The Fundamental Premise
Corporations face a plethora of claims that they are often quite con-
vinced no rational person would make, particularly in the context of con-
sumer claims.151  Private mass settlements offer these companies a new and
powerful option in heading off these lawsuits.  Thus far, courts faced with
class certification in the wake of a private mass settlement offer have focused
upon whether the class counsel will be able to obtain any benefit for the class
not already on offer from the defendant.152  As a result, the key to utilizing a
mass settlement to inoculate against a class action turns upon offering full
compensation.
In establishing its settlement fund, the emerging doctrine therefore
incentivizes companies to follow the same procedures used in court-approved
settlements.  This practice allows the company to insulate itself against chal-
lenges arguing that its program was defective in informing the consumers
about the settlement, and thus the value of the class action will not be a
superior monetary recovery but instead effective notice.  A company would
therefore provide notice to the eligible consumers or victims, whether
through direct communications, website, or traditional newspaper advertis-
ing, in order to satisfy the due process standards that would apply in settle-
ment.153  As a matter of best practices, this notice is more likely to be done
through a combination of these methods.
Drafting the notice in plain language, akin to the short-form and long-
form notices in a Rule 23 settlement, not only increases claimant understand-
ing and thus allows for increased participation but also reduces the risk of
inadequate notice preventing formal closure.154  If the corporation will have
150 See supra Part I.
151 For a similar argument regarding securities lawsuits, see Paul Atkins, The Supreme
Court’s Opportunity to End Abusive Class Action Securities Lawsuits, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/04/the-supreme-courts-opportunity-to-
end-abusive-securities-class-action-lawsuits/ (commenting on arguments in Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)).
152 See supra Part I (discussing In re Aqua Dots and In re Deepwater Horizon).
153 For the Federal Judicial Center’s latest guidance, see Judges’ Class Action Notice and
Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2010), http://www.fjc
.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NotCheck.pdf/$file/NotCheck.pdf.
154 Small-value claims are typically addressed through simple short-form style notices.
See, e.g., U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, RECALL HANDBOOK 18–25 (2012).  How-
ever, attention should be given to any government-mandated minimums.  In contrast,
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a claims cut-off date, this should be included as well to minimize chal-
lenges—although, for reasons that will be explained below, the company
should presumptively disfavor restrictions on participation.155  To the extent
that corporations seek to minimize later-filed classes, one may expect that
notice campaigns tailored to the particular dispute’s unique features should
be anticipated.  For example, the education levels and geographic dispersion
of the victims, the corporation’s access to contact information for the vic-
tims—whether through its own records or through an intermediary, the
traditional media these victims are likely to access (whether television, radio,
or even newspapers and magazines), as well as the potential for using
Internet technology (whether through search engine searches, advertise-
ments, or even YouTube or other social media campaigns), will likely all be
considered.156
To maximize the likelihood of preventing class certification, a company
would offer substantive terms that are equivalent to any recovery possible
through litigation.157  For many companies, this may be easier said than
done, given variations in damages under state law.158  But, as a threshold
matter, the compensation offered should not be lower than that available
under the corporation’s own state law, as this standard would leave the cor-
poration subject to a nationwide class action filed under its own law.159
With this baseline, the company can then consider whether an upward
ratcheting of damages should occur.  One option is for the corporation to
consult with its counsel on the damages available by state, and designate a
higher payout for residents of certain states.160  This allows the company to
pay more in the handful of states where exemplary damages are available,
high-value claims will often require far more careful summaries of the programs. See, e.g.,
Feinberg Announces GM Ignition Compensation Claims Resolution Facility, GM IGNITION COMP.
CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/ (last visited Oct.
27, 2014) [hereinafter GM IGNITION COMP. CLAIMS].
155 See, e.g., Jovel v. Boiron, Inc., No. 11-cv-10803-SVW-SHx, 2014 WL 1027874, at *7
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014) (granting certification where time period in proposed settlement
varied from that in the private refund program).
156 See Julie Locke, Tips for Using New Media in Class Action Notice Plans, LAW 360 (Jan.
19, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/218356/tips-for-using-new-media-in-class-
action-notice-plans (discussing modern class notice programs).
157 See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2012);
In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011).
158 See generally Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2027 (2008) (discussing rules regarding choice of law for federal class
actions).
159 For an insightful discussion of these complexities and their emergence, see Stephen
B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156
U. PA. L. Rev. 1439 (2008).
160 As an example of a program that varies compensation by location, although in the
context of a settlement fund that the defendant sought to have approved through the class
action mechanism by the court, see FAQ, KIA MPG INFO., https://kiampginfo.com/
faq#litigation (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).  This is in contrast to settlement funds that use
geography/state residence as part of the eligibility criteria; for example, the GCCF’s subse-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 39  8-DEC-14 14:51
2014] privatizing  mass  settlement 373
without over-compensating all claimants.  However, as a practical matter, the
company may decide to streamline processing by granting all claimants a uni-
form level of compensation.161  This beneficence generates not only intangi-
ble goodwill, but also builds in a heightened burden for would-be class
counsel to overcome in establishing that they can obtain any legal remedy
not already on offer.162
2. Maximizing Closure
In crafting its settlement program, the corporation and its claims pro-
gram designer are inherently balancing the intersecting concerns of effi-
ciency, accuracy, and legitimacy.163  As a matter of legitimacy and to increase
the likelihood of surviving any subsequent challenge to the program, the cor-
poration should bear the full costs of administration without contribution
from claimants or a diminution of their compensation.  Some corporations
attempt to cut corners in this regard, for example, requiring the consumer to
bear the costs of return postage if a defective item is to be returned and
exchanged.164  Surely this saves a minimal amount on postage and may even
disincentivize some consumers from bothering to return the defective prod-
uct.165  Yet, if the cost of this penny-pinching at the margins is to create a
colorable argument for plaintiffs’ counsel that they could provide a superior
net remedy for the plaintiffs—by eliminating these costs through a different
quent MDL successor used proximity to the Gulf as one factor in presuming damages
causation—although this is now on appeal.
161 The GM ignition-switch fund cases follow this model. See GM IGNITION COMP.
CLAIMS, supra note 154.
162 See, e.g., Daigle v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-3214 (MJD/LIB), 2012 WL 3113854, at
*5–6 (D. Minn. July 31, 2012) (“Ford does acknowledge that there may be class members
that paid to have the entire transmission replaced, and who may not be fully reimbursed
because replacement of the entire transmission is not required to repair the defective tor-
que converter.  Despite the possibility that certain class members will not be fully reim-
bursed through the recall, the Court nonetheless finds that the recall weighs against a
finding that a class action is a superior method of adjudication of the claims asserted in this
case.”).
163 See generally CPR INST., supra note 113, at 85–114.
164 One variant some corporations have utilized is offering to reimburse the claimant
for these mailing costs, up to a reasonable amount. See, e.g., Microsoft North American Retail
Product Refund Guidelines, MICROSOFT http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/productrefund/
refund.mspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
165 The buyer-pays approach is particularly common among high shipping cost items.
Nevertheless, it may give rise to claims by putative class counsel that they could obtain
more for the victims who were incentivized to keep the item because two-way shipping
would swamp the return value, making retaining the item or selling it a superior option,
and preventing them from privately vindicating their rights without litigation. See, e.g.,
Bowflex® Buy Back Guarantee, BOWFLEX, http://bowflex.com/bowflex-home-gyms-us/custo
mersupport/returns.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); cf. Hatebowflex4goodreason, Do Not
Buy from Bowflex or Nautilus, PISSED CONSUMER (Jan. 3, 2009), http://bowflex.pissedconsu
mer.com/do-not-buy-from-bowflex-or-nautilus-20090103143659.html (customer alleging
that his return costs would have exceeded the value of the machine).
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claim mechanism or by obtaining a remedy from those deterred by those
costs—it may well be a fool’s bargain.
Accepting that the company will bear administrative costs rebalances the
preference between efficiency and accuracy.  Some defendants seek detailed
claims forms, whether as a reflexive continuation of the adversariality of the
litigation process or more strategically to reduce the likelihood of subsequent
challenge or claim of error.  Claims forms can be an essential component
where the victim class is unidentifiable, or otherwise difficult to ascertain.166
Even where the would-be class members are identifiable, only a subset of
these will likely have suffered the alleged injury.167  While a corporation
may—and one might say should—make direct offers to consumers that have
already complained to the company, there should be a mechanism for other
consumers to file claims—if only to ensure that victims had a full and fair
opportunity to participate sufficient to decrease the risk of class certification.
Claims forms can also be useful in determining damages, particularly where
the defendant does not have perfect information on the identity of the
claims holders or the damages suffered.
However, there are reasons to hesitate before employing a robust claims
form in the private mass settlement process.  First, the form should be
streamlined to include only required information in order to ensure that the
form is not deemed burdensome.168  Second, to the extent that the payment
formula becomes more complex, requiring more inputs, there is greater like-
lihood of an error being made—and potentially opening the door to a chal-
lenge akin to the ones made against the BP GCCF.  Third, even if no errors
are made, it is the would-be defendant that is bearing the processing costs.
Thus, a hard question must be asked as to whether the additional coding
required for each question added to the form will generate sufficient cost
savings to offset for the additional data entry time it requires.  The corpora-
tion should also anticipate that additional questions may yield not only direct
processing costs, but may also be filled out incompletely, incorrectly, or illegi-
bly, requiring the claims administrator to reach out to the individual and
request supplemental information.  Depending upon the nature of the
claims envisioned, the cost of merely mailing a notice back with a pre-paid
envelope could exceed the cost of the claim.  Thus, while there may be an
initial impetus toward a highly accurate damages figure, the company may
166 As an example of the tiered compensation system allowing recovery with or without
proof of purchase, in the context of a court-approved settlement, see Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, GCG, http://www.cytosportclassactionsettlement.com/faq#Q4 (last visited Oct. 28,
2014).
167 Cf. Webb v. Carter’s Inc., 272 F.R.D. 489, 505 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that
private refund fund’s 0.14% participation rate was caused not by apathy or a lack of notice,
but by most consumers being satisfied with the product).
168 Cf. supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
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find that allowing a higher fixed rate is preferable to the administrative costs
accuracy entails.169
But, if the company uses a fixed or simple formula, does it open itself to
a BP challenge?  Fixed rate or simple formulas are particularly helpful in
cases in which the damages are essentially a mathematical equation identical
for all plaintiffs.170  For example, in many securities and antitrust cases, dam-
ages can be calculated by multiplying the alleged damages per unit by the
number of units held by the claimant.171
In other cases, there may be some incidental damages, but these may be
so various and difficult to prove (and in turn assess) that the company recog-
nizes that the cost of processing and risk of challenge outweigh the benefit.
Using a streamlined formula in which a generous, standardized amount is
provided for these individualized damages not only decreases administrative
costs, but may also generate a public relations benefit stemming from the
unquestionably generous settlement offer.  This may in turn increase partici-
pation rates and further decrease the risk of tagalong class actions.  The gas
mileage settlement provides an excellent example, as the formula included
an additional sum for incidental damages and inconvenience—preventing
would-be class counsel from basing their class certification motion on de
minimis individualized damages.172
But, as a backstop to these options, the company may also consider
allowing a claimant to include any individualized damages claim for harms
that purportedly exceed those already on offer.173  Allowing a statement to
be included on the claims form, including an explanation of the amount
sought and a rationale will frequently provide the most de minimis possible
burden upon claimants challenging the payment grid or formula.174  The
claims form might also provide for the arbitration of any such claim by a
respected third party based upon the written claim and the corporation’s
response, if the corporation does not stipulate to the damages claimed.  As
occurred with Concepcion waivers, the company may simply waive particularly
169 See generally CPR INST., supra note 113, at 85–114 (discussing cost-benefit analysis in
claims funds generally).
170 Id. at 93–95.
171 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolu-
tion Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2005) (discussing claims resolution facilities).
172 See Hyundai and Kia Initiate Voluntary Program to Adjust Fuel Economy Ratings on Select
Vehicles, KIA (Nov. 2, 2013), https://kiampginfo.com/news/details/hyundai-and-kia-initi
ate-voluntary-program-to-adjust-fuel-economy-ratings/ (“Customers will receive a personal-
ized debit card that will reimburse them for their difference in the EPA combined fuel
economy rating, based on the fuel price in their area and their own actual miles driven.  In
addition, as an acknowledgement of the inconvenience this may cause, we will add an extra
15 percent to the reimbursement amount.”).
173 This feature has already been incorporated into many larger scale mass tort settle-
ments. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 79, 105–07 (1990).
174 Cf. GM IGNITION COMP. CLAIMS, supra note 154.
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small-value claims, while retaining the ability to contest any frivolous claims—
in order to deter particularly meritless filings.175
The creation of an appellate process does entail additional costs in
implementation and administration.176  However, it may be worthwhile in
the peace that it provides, in avoiding litigation over claims processing errors
and by demonstrating superiority over class action remedies.  Well-con-
structed appeals processes have the ability to offer an individual claimant an
objectively superior alternative to the class action’s opt-out mechanism, as the
claimed differential between the settlement and purported actual damages
can be easily recovered by the individual, without requiring the individual to
go it alone in establishing the merits of the underlying claim.  Moreover, the
individual is able to capture the full damages without deduction for attor-
ney’s fees and costs, which can often represent a substantial portion of the
recovery—or even exceed it entirely.177
3. Implications for Compensation and Deterrence
Only recently, these ideas might have seemed heretical to many.  Yet, in
recent years scholars and plaintiffs’ counsel alike have come to recognize that
compensation often never occurs in these small-value cases—and even if it is
on offer, few obtain it.  There has thus been increasing recognition that these
small-value cases are not about compensation, but instead are serving a pri-
marily deterrent function.
At the same time, defendants have often quietly indicated to counsel
that they are quite willing to modify their practices to avoid any confusion,
but they simply litigate because they are unwilling to pay millions to settle a
claim they see as either wholly unmeritorious or reflective of the concerns of
only a fraction of their consumers.  In other cases, the litigation centers on
an issue that is squarely within the ambit of a regulatory agency; for example,
alleging that despite compliance with Food and Drug Administration label-
ing requirements, the product name or other markings on the product were
misleading.178  These lawsuits have been particularly challenging, as judges
struggle with the extent to which the relief sought disrupts the decisions of
the agency that Congress tasked with regulation.  Thus, even if the company
is willing to change its practices, the necessity of judicial involvement can
create separation of powers, preemption, and federalism concerns.
Against this shifting normative backdrop, private mass settlement has
much to commend as a mechanism for addressing these claims by realigning
key stakeholders’ incentives.  While corporations may dismiss claims as frivo-
175 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
176 See generally CPR INST., supra note 113, at 85–114.
177 See Voigt, supra note 120, at 619–20 (describing a class settlement in which the fee
deducted from absent class members’ accounts often exceeded the amount obtained in
the litigation, such that “many class members had a net economic loss as a result of the
class settlement”).
178 Delacruz v. Cytosport, Inc., No. C 11-3532 CW, 2012 WL 1215243, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 11, 2012).
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lous, undertaking a bilateral mass settlement requires the payment of those
who come forward to claim injury.  Thus, it forces the corporation to set
aside its biases and take a hard look at the alleged wrong to be sure that it is
one that is truly frivolous.  For consumers, it allows all those who feel
wronged to come forward and obtain full compensation—without deduction
for substantial legal fees or a delay of years as the litigation and settlement
proceed.  But, it also protects customers, ensuring that prices are not driven
up by the costs of either defending or settling meritless litigation.
B. A First Step in a Public Relations Recovery?
The most high profile uses of private settlement funds have resulted
from public relations disasters—BP’s fund179 and GM’s current ignition-
switch compensation fund180 being quintessential examples.  For legal schol-
ars, the idea that a company would de facto waive the myriad of legal
defenses that they might have, accelerating payment to the present rather
than delaying in years of litigation, is completely contrary to theory and
expectation.
But, corporations are fundamentally businesses—and these funds
adhere to the first principles of disaster management.  Indeed, for both com-
panies, the primary criticisms came from failures to implement these policies
early enough or completely enough—in essence, the failure to get out in
front of the problem.  What, then, are the fundamental lessons learned from
these examples of high-end private claims funds?  What roadmap does this
suggest for a corporation considering the use of a settlement offer?
With these answers in hand, we can then turn to an assessment of the
existing aggregation mechanisms and emerging doctrine governing private
funds.  Are we getting the right normative outcomes?  Or are there particular
situations in which the background law is creating strategic behavior that
undermines rather than reinforces the principles of deterrence, compensa-
tion, and legitimacy?
1. Building Credibility: The First Days
First, establishing a settlement fund takes time.  It will take time to select
a claims administrator and support staff, and for that administrator to draft
the eligibility criteria, payment framework, and release of liability, if that will
be a component of the fund.181  Moreover, in many situations the participa-
179 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
180 See generally Ignition Recall Safety Information, GEN. MOTORS, http://www.gmignition
update.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (providing information about the current status of
the General Motors ignition recall).
181 For example, although GM’s selected claims administrator had established many
similar funds in the past, see Gregory Wallace, Ken Feinberg to Lead GM Compensation, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 1, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/01/news/companies/
general-motors-kenneth-feinberg/, four months passed from the time his selection was
announced to the unveiling of the compensation protocol.
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tion of the victims in crafting or commenting on the framework will be an
important component of obtaining the buy-in and legitimacy necessary for
high participation rates.182  This participation further extends the delay until
implementation of the framework.
How can this delay be managed?  First, a truly empathetic statement of
the company’s regret for the harm caused and desire to support the victims
should be delivered early and clearly.  These statements need not admit legal
liability; rather, the key for the victims often lays in the credibility of the indi-
vidual making the statement and the sense that the regret is truly heart-
felt.183  In most cases, the most senior officer capable of expressing the
requisite empathy should deliver the statement.184
Second, this should be paired with a clear, concrete action plan.  The
company should indicate, to the maximum extent possible, its willingness to
create a compensation fund and the steps it has already taken toward this
end.  This statement should also explain what steps remain to be taken
before the settlement details will be released and finalized, so that victims
understand concretely why the company cannot simply write checks today.
This transparency can help to empower the victims through information and
assure them that compensation is coming.
2. Claims Estimation
One of the biggest challenges the corporation faces in high-value claims
funds is estimating the number and value of claims.  Although recently some
courts have insisted on claims-made class settlement funds,185 traditionally
corporations have been able to negotiate fixed-fund settlements.186  For the
corporation, a fixed-fund settlement provides closure, capping the compen-
sation that will be paid to the class.  But, private claims resolution funds have
typically been structured as claims-made funds, in which the company agrees
to pay the full settlement value of every claim.187  Indeed, because the private
settlement does not provide closure as to nonparticipants, a corporation
would not want to offer a fixed fund, as it may dramatically overcompensate
182 FEINBERG, supra note 19, 11–13, 48 (discussing role of victim participation in shap-
ing the settlement funds, and resulting satisfaction in Agent Orange settlement and cathar-
sis in the September 11 process).
183 Mary Barra’s handling of the GM ignition switch meetings exemplifies this cathartic
focus. See, e.g., Jeff Bennett, GM’s Mary Barra Meets with Families of Victims, WALL ST. J., Mar.
31, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023041572045794739408
45171608?mod=_newsreel_1.
184 The contrast between the GM executives’ and BP executives’ handling of these early
interactions underscores this dichotomy.
185 Cf. Welcome to the NFL Concussion Settlement Program Website, NFL CONCUSSION SETTLE-
MENT, https://www.nflconcussionsettlement.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter
NFL Concussion Settlement Website].
186 See Dodge, supra note 18, at 1266–68.
187 For an extended discussion of the typology of private settlement structures, see id.
at 1271–83.
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as against the participation rate.  So too, for victims a fixed fund would fur-
ther increase the uncertainty about the defendant’s unilateral offer.
A claims-made fund places the burden of properly estimating claims in
both quantity and value squarely upon defendants.  If it underestimates the
nature of the claims, it will bear either the cost of the additional compensa-
tion or the litigation costs an aborted claims resolution facility will likely
engender.
In assessing claims volume, the corporation faces two considerations.
First, the corporation must assess the volume of total potential claims.  This
determination may be a simple matter that can be projected from product
sales data or other simple assessment tools—for example, where the claim
involves all products sold during a particular timeframe.  But, it may also
require a more complex assessment, some variables of which cannot be ascer-
tained with any degree of certainty—for example, where still-evolving science
or early epidemiological studies are relied upon to project the incidence of
injury among a potential claimant population.  This projection becomes all
the more uncertain where future claimants are anticipated, as where latent
illnesses may emerge.  The company may therefore consider using a combi-
nation of historical and pending claims data, epidemiological studies, and
actuarial assessments to attempt to develop as accurate an understanding of
claims volume as possible—but, the risk of the type of substantial errors that
occurred in the Manville bankruptcy, silicone breast implants, and Agent
Orange all stand as stark reminders of the consequences of
miscalculation.188
Second, the corporation must also attempt to estimate the percentage of
these potential claimants who will participate in the settlement fund.  This
understanding is essential to developing a claims fund whose size, scope, and
resources are commensurate with the expected volume of claims at the vari-
ous phases of processing and paying out claims.
Further complicating this analysis is the potential for the settlement
fund’s creation and structure itself to shift these claim rates.  Some of these
features are purely based on process: the announcement of the fund may
itself prompt a short-term spike in filing rates, as claimants become aware of
their opportunity to resolve the claim—or even of the potential cause of
action itself.189  A well-administered fund may generate a continuing stream
of applications, as claimants become comfortable with foregoing litigation in
favor of participation in the settlement fund.  Filing deadlines may also drive
temporary spikes in participation, which the claims administrator should
anticipate in deploying its resources.
Other variations in claims rates can be attributed to a combination of
procedural and substantive factors.  This interaction can be particularly acute
where the compensation available to any claimant varies based upon the tim-
ing and value of other claims.  Thus, the settlement structure itself can incen-
188 See CPR INST., supra note 113, at 74.
189 Id. at 76–86.
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tivize filing strategies that increase or decrease claims rates at various points
in the claims process.
3. Eligibility Framework
Based upon the projected claims estimation figures, the corporation will
need to make a strategic decision as to which claims it will include in its
private fund.  Theoretically, the company could offer to pay all claims.  But,
as a practical matter this is often not optimal.  Even with respect to the Sep-
tember 11 claims, the special master found it necessary to draw a line as to
which claims would be included and which would be excluded.  The lines
drawn for eligibility in the September 11 Fund created clear, objective rules
for inclusion in it, allowing for a focus upon the most serious claims while
excluding claims for minor or secondary harms, distant in time or location
from the sites of the attacks.190
Corporations thus must make a strategic decision.  On the one hand, it
can offer to pay all valid claims, recognizing that this will likely vastly increase
processing costs, but expecting that it will have a concurrent public relations
benefit in allowing it to say “we are paying all valid claims, no exceptions.”
On the other hand, the company can offer to settle only a subset of claims,
streamlining processing and saving the cost of paying out minimal-value
claims.  The public relations aspect of this line drawing will often be influ-
enced primarily by the company’s prior reputation or goodwill and the
degree of culpability or blameworthiness the public has found in its actions.
If the company decides to engage in line drawing, a number of strategic
considerations arise.  The corporation will likely begin with an assumption
that it will pay all legally valid claims and not pay claims that are without legal
merit.  However, the company may decide not to include those small-value
claims that are so de minimis that neither the individuals nor a class action
attorney could financially pursue recovery; thus, anticipated negative-value
claims may be excluded.  The company has two options in such a situation.
With sufficient goodwill and confidence in its program, the company may
decide to simply exclude these individuals from the settlement, drawing its
offer to include only those individuals likely to sue, while excluding others
entirely—as was done with the September 11 Fund and the Hokie Memorial
Fund.  Alternatively, the company may decide to create a presumption that
certain victims were injured, streamlining recovery for those individuals,
while requiring more remote victims to affirmatively prove causation—as was
done with the BP GCCF.191
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the corporation may also decide
not to include the claims that it expects victims will not settle without a pre-
mium.  From a strategic perspective, to obtain the participation of these indi-
viduals, the company would need to ratchet up all compensation—vastly
increasing the cost of the fund.  Assuming the company does not want to do
190 See FEINBERG, supra note 19, at 46.
191 See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
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so, these individuals may become vocal opponents of the fund, soliciting
others to not participate as well.  This may leave sufficient nonparticipation
to make a class action financially viable.  To avoid this outcome, the fund may
exclude these individuals from the baseline settlement offer, allowing for
one-off negotiations—whether through a different mechanism within the
same fund or through a separate process altogether.
As this discussion suggests, corporations need not view the scope of the
fund as a binary matter, in which a particular claimant either receives pay-
ment or not.  Instead, the fund may operate along a spectrum.  The company
may designate certain classes of claimants who are automatically eligible for
compensation, leaving only the calculation of damages.  Other classes of
claimants may be designated for which questions of general causation are
waived, but as to which specific causation must still be proven.  And, finally,
the company may even decide that there are certain claims as to which it is
simply unwilling to streamline the process, preferring to litigate as to both
general and specific causation.
In making this determination, corporations have at times seemingly
overlooked the basic distinction between settlement and litigation.  In settle-
ment, parties make concessions on issues they would ordinarily fight in litiga-
tion; indeed, it is for this reason that defendants will support class
certification for purposes of settlement, reserving their right to contest certi-
fication if the settlement does not receive final approval.  But, in the transi-
tion from BP’s private fund (the GCCF), to the public MDL settlement fund,
the parties maintained many of the beneficent waivers of causation that had
been made in the GCCF.  In the GCCF context, these waivers were part of a
broader goodwill campaign and not contested by BP.  But, as the MDL claims
administration process moved forward, BP began challenging the application
of these same waivers—resulting in multiple, costly appeals to the Fifth Cir-
cuit and an anticipated appeal to the Supreme Court.  While these public
and private processes look very similar—indeed, the BP settlements used the
same claims administration apparatus, save for a change in the claims admin-
istrator himself—the underlying dynamics are often very different.  What
works in one process cannot simply be swapped into the other.
Claims administration processes often look increasingly cookie-cutter.
And, this may save on initial startup costs, but this savings is often short-lived.
Instead, careful customization is necessary to ensure an efficient, fair, and
comprehensive process.  For the defendant, customization can ensure that
the right claims are included and excluded from the fund, minimizing not
only processing costs but also the risk of successful collateral challenges.  For
the victims, this customization ensures that those that are the most harmed
are able to receive timely compensation, which is not diluted by the weak
claims of others, and that the process has the resources to provide for the
types of one-on-one assessments, counseling, and closure that are often essen-
tial to the success of a high-stakes claims fund.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 48  8-DEC-14 14:51
382 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
4. Eligibility Determinations
Corporations crafting a claims fund as part of a disaster mitigation strat-
egy commonly distance themselves from the details of the settlement fund.
This allows the corporation to make simple, plain language promises of full
compensation through the fund, keeping the message to media and victims
simple.  But, this may also advance the perception of an arms-length claims
fund, in which an independent claims administrator is making the determi-
nations of claims value.  Leaving the determination of details to the adminis-
trator may thus promote the legitimacy of the fund, helping to improve
participation rates.  But, as evidenced by the BP MDL debacle, discretion
comes at a cost given that claims administrators’ success in obtaining partici-
pation—and in turn selection for future engagements—requires them to
obtain a reputation of neutrality.192
Why do corporations not simply screen better in selecting their claims
administrator?  Often the selection process appears rigorous on paper, with
the consideration of multiple candidates and rounds of interviews before an
administrator is hired.  But, as a practical matter, the universe of claims
administrators is exceedingly small and dominated by repeat players.  This
dramatically restricts the degree to which meaningful discussion can occur.
The better approach may therefore focus upon a systemic solution, rec-
ognizing that the incentive structure—if not the duty—for the claims admin-
istrator will result in a neutral interpretation of the fund, if not one favoring
the claimants.  Corporations have the opportunity at the outset to carefully
design the eligibility criteria and scope of the fund.  Just as a settlement
agreement’s terms are carefully scrutinized with an eye toward future litiga-
tion, so too the claims framework and defense waivers should be carefully
scrutinized.  If there are certain types of claims that the corporation is unwill-
ing to pay, it should ensure that these are clearly and unequivocally outside
of the fund’s eligibility criteria—rather than assuming the administrator will
share its conclusions on causation.  If the administrator is retained to aid in
the drafting of the terms, as is commonly done, he or she should work with
the defendant to help reality test the framework, to ensure buy-in.193
Ultimately, the corporation and claims administrator will need to bal-
ance the desire for a purely arms-length process in which the administrator
independently designs the fund, and a process where they work as partners
in designing the system but then leave the implementation to the administra-
tor alone or a separate claims administration entity.
Whatever balance is struck—whether the grant of discretion is broad or
narrow—the structure will inherently include both some degree of discretion
to address unforeseen eventualities and some basic agreement on the con-
tours of the fund.  For example, is the fund intended to function as a litiga-
tion substitute in which individuals must waive their right to sue?  If so, is the
settlement administrator to pay all claims that he determines to be legally
192 See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text
193 See CRR INST., supra note 113, at 81.
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valid?  Does he have the discretion to pay other claims that are not legally
cognizable, but still legitimate?
In addition, the corporation will typically provide the scope of the fund
in its retention of the claims administrator.194  In some cases, it may seem
intuitive.  For example, with GM’s ignition defect fund, it may be particular
models manufactured in particular years.  But, what if additional models are
found to be defective?  What if other defects are found in these same cars?
Even assuming a clear scope, second-generation questions quickly
emerge in defining the eligible pool of claimants.  Continuing the GM exam-
ple, where a car has been sold, does the present owner have the exclusive
right to compensation?  What if the car was sold after the defect was
announced, such that the original owner claims that the resale value of the
car was diminished?  What if the car was totaled years ago, so that no one
currently holds the title, or perhaps it is held in a junkyard?  What if the car
was totaled in an accident related to the ignition switch, which was already
covered by insurance?  Should the driver have a claim for the increased insur-
ance premiums he had to pay thereafter?  What if he subsequently divorced;
does the ex-wife then also have a claim for the lost value?
The answers to these questions may then impact the eligible pool of
claimants.  For example, what should the result be where the driver claimed
that the ignition switch was responsible, but police rejected the claim at the
time believing that the driver had instead negligently accelerated—should
the old criminal conviction govern, or should the claims administrator
undertake a de novo investigation?  Does the driver have a claim?  What
about the estate of the victims killed in the accident?  What about the driver’s
children, who have now grown up without a father, while he has been in jail
for years for what was deemed manslaughter?  Does the state have a claim for
recoupment of its costs in trying and jailing the driver if GM knew about the
defect but did not reveal it?
Corporations and claims administrators alike seek to create the maxi-
mum distance between the corporation and the settlement fund, in order to
enhance the legitimacy of the fund.  While many of the decisions described
above may be left to the discretion of the claims administrator, the contract
with the administrator should both outline the company’s agreement to this
discretion and the limits upon the administrator’s sui generis authority.
Indeed, in the BP MDL, even though the claims administrator was given a
complete settlement agreement, which had far greater restrictions than are
common to private funds, BP has still challenged the administrator’s deci-
sions and interpretations of the agreement as beyond his authority.195  The
company should thus carefully consider at the outset what terms it is truly
prepared to leave in the complete discretion of the administrator, rather
than offering a broad grant of discretion.
194 Id. at 53–54.
195 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 795–98 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting various
objections).
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This decision should be a considered one, focused upon the company’s
key concerns, so as to avoid removing the veneer of independence.  The BP
GCCF provides the counterexample.  BP retained a nationally known media-
tor, with a longstanding reputation for fairness.  While BP paid Kenneth
Feinberg’s fees, his appointment was made with the approval of the White
House—unlike most appointments, which are made with no extrinsic check.
Yet, even with the joint selection of a well-known neutral, BP and Feinberg
quickly faced criticism and allegations that Feinberg was simply a puppet for
BP—even as he relied on a panel of scholars drawn from preeminent institu-
tions for the challenged determinations.196  Recognizing this dynamic and
natural suspicion suggests the careful balance corporations must walk in
selecting, compensating, and directing a claims administrator.
5. Claims Valuation
The work of claims valuation typically remains squarely in the hands of
the settlement administrator—in contrast to traditional public settlements in
which the parties negotiate the framework and, in class actions, is approved
by the court.  However, a few preliminary remarks may be useful in clarifying
the unique aspects of private funds.
As discussed in Part I, claims valuation may be done on a purely individ-
ualized basis or as part of a settlement grid.  In recent years, corporations
have begun offering claimants a choice between the presumptive formula
and an individual analysis.  Assuming that claimants select the net superior
option—adjusted for opportunity cost, delay, and the cost and effort of gath-
ering individualized information—the corporation should expect that claim-
ants who are overcompensated by the flat rate offer accept it, while those
with greater damages will elect individualized recovery.  Flat rate offers and
formulas will thus either fully compensate or overcompensate the individuals
who select those methods, creating a one-way systemic bias toward
overcompensation.
This would suggest a preference for individual assessments.  But,
because the corporation will bear the costs of processing these claims, a cer-
tain degree of overcompensation can be subsidized by the efficiency gained
from streamlined processing.  Moreover, the transparency of a flat rate or
formula structure may increase participation rates directly, as well as decrease
the presence of vocal objectors.  As these participation rates increase, the
legitimacy of the fund should also increase, potentially gaining additional
participants who are assured that the fund is paying out as promised.  As a
result, corporations are at times offering presumptive amounts of compensa-
tion, as well as an opt-out individualized process that can obtain the participa-
tion of true outliers.
196 See Jef Feeley & Allen M. Johnson Jr., BP Mediator Feinberg Can’t Call Himself Indepen-
dent, Judge Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-02-02/bp-mediator-can-t-identify-himself-as-independent-court-rules.html.
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6. Special Considerations in Extreme Harm Cases
Where the claim is one that caused substantial harm—for example, sig-
nificant bodily injury, death, or even a spiral of unemployment into bank-
ruptcy, divorce, or other nonphysical trauma—inclusion of an opportunity
for catharsis has the potential to significantly increase participation rates in
some cases.197  Typically, this includes an ability to meet with a senior repre-
sentative of the company or the claims administrator, simply to share the
details of the harm suffered and the loss created.  These meetings need not
be tied directly to damages or compensation; instead, it is to give the victims
and/or their families the opportunity to share their story.  This component is
particularly important to the extent that the corporation’s settlement will typ-
ically supersede the victim’s day in court.  For many victims, there is a need to
tell their story and be heard, which is strong enough that failure to attend to
this psychological need may reduce participation rates—and, at the extreme,
decrease participation to the rate that it undermines the legitimacy of the
settlement.198
Another common coping mechanism in severe harm cases is a need to
find purpose in the tragedy, commonly by ensuring that the lessons of the
tragedy are learned so that others do not have to suffer in the same way.
Crafting such an outlet into the process can be particularly helpful in reme-
dying these extra-legal concerns, enabling individuals to feel psychologically
able to accept the settlement.  In some cases, this may be done through
organized opportunities to meet with corporate representatives and work on
a committee tasked with remedial or preventative measures.  In other cases,
creating a blue-ribbon panel to make recommendations on reform or testify
before administrators or legislators might be an appropriate avenue.  Each of
these techniques is intended to demonstrate the company’s true sorrow for
the harm that has occurred and willingness to engage in self-help.  To the
extent that the settlement will supplant private discovery through the litiga-
tion process, these groups can help mitigate concerns about the lack of judi-
cial oversight.  So too, if the incident is one that will generate legislative
inquiries and potential reform, this process allows the company to get in
front of the process and put forward its own reforms, with the buy-in of the
victims.  Properly conducted and with the support of the corporation and
defendant, these proposals can have an anchoring affect in reform by provid-
ing a starting point for legislation.199
The ability of the company to participate in these activities is highly cor-
related with the level of trust it has established with victims.  If the relation-
ship has soured through early denials of responsibility or perceived
deception and trust has not yet been regained, corporate participation may
be seen as attempting to derail the work of the group, pacify the victims, and
ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the program.  Thus, in some cases,
197 See CPR INST., supra note 113, at 104.
198 See FEINBERG, supra note 19, at 44.
199 See id.
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for the victims to obtain the purpose they seek, a trusted outsider may need
to lead the group.  For a corporation, bankrolling an effort to instigate
reform targeting its own practices, led by a traditional adversary such as plain-
tiffs’ counsel or a consumer-rights advocate, can be a troubling notion.  Yet, it
is precisely for these reasons that the work can help rebuild the perception of
corporate integrity by showcasing the company’s willingness to truly learn
from its (presumed) past mistakes.  This is not to say that this type of cam-
paign is always necessary or desirable; rather, it is to say it is one aspect of a
potential response that should be evaluated in designing the corporate
settlement.200
7. Implications for Compensation and Deterrence
Compensation funds should offer the best of both worlds.  Companies
take responsibility for their wrongs and quickly compensate victims.  Those
that they do not compensate retain the ability to move forward in the litiga-
tion system: class actions for small-value harms, while high-value claimants
will likely prefer to file in the inevitable MDL—further incentivizing corpora-
tions to make offers that offer full compensation as defined by applicable law.
Moreover, to the extent these are offered in the wake of a tragedy or other
high-profile incident, government investigations are likely to proceed parallel
to these instances, mitigating the risk to the public interest.201
One of the most interesting consequences of these programs is epito-
mized by the Hokie Memorial Fund, created from public donations made in
the wake of a university mass shooting.  The donations were far from suffi-
cient to pay all of those that might have claims at law, or even to pay the full
damages of the most seriously injured or killed.  The university and its claims
administrator worked to create a program that would compensate those
injured or whose lives were lost, even though this compensation was only
partial.  The fund was not intended as a litigation substitute; no release was
required, victims could still sue the university alleging it had not done
enough to prevent the shooting.  But they did not.  Only a handful of claims
were ultimately filed against the university.
Was this a normatively good outcome?  On the one hand, if victims were
satisfied with the process and found peace outside the litigation system, per-
haps we should laud this as an even better outcome than the conflict and
adversarial nature of litigation.  On the other hand, one might say that this
suggests the danger of mass settlement: they may not merely allow defend-
ants a streamlined mechanism for paying the compensation due, but to pay
only a fraction of what is due—whether by restricting who is paid, how much
is paid, or, as in the case of the Hokie Fund, both.  This implicates funda-
mental questions about our goals as a society that far transcend the scope of
this Article.  If the victims are satisfied, is that enough?
200 See id.
201 See generally FEINBERG, supra note 55.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 53  8-DEC-14 14:51
2014] privatizing  mass  settlement 387
C. Limitations on the Use of Bilateral Mass Settlement
The first two sections profiled the extremes of the litigation bell curve,
illustrating the robustness of private claims funds.  But are there limits?  This
Section turns to that question, asking under what circumstances defendants
should forego a private resolution in favor of the public litigation process.
1. Uncertain Merits
Unlike the prototypical fact pattern in the prior two sections, some cases
include substantial and fundamental questions about causation.  The com-
pany’s liability is not so irrefutable that it feels public pressure to make its
alleged wrong right.  Nor can the company be entirely confident that the
wrong is so meritless or trivial that it could simply offer to make payment to
resolve the matter.  Instead, these cases require bearing the costs of discovery
to develop the merits.  These cases necessitate the role of plaintiffs’ counsel
to negotiate a settlement based upon the fractional probability of success on
the merits, and to assure the victims that the deal is a fair one in light of the
totality of the circumstances.
The consequences for the defendant of attempting to go it alone in
these cases are indicative of the limits of bilateral mass settlements.  Corpora-
tions attempting a payout of less than the victims’ subjective expectation of
damages often struggle to gain participation, even if they offer accurate legal
explanations for their payout.  Not only are lay people not trained in legal
analysis, but tort victims in particular are often at an emotional point that
renders them ill equipped to accept legal explanations for decisions to mini-
mize their financial compensation.  Indeed, while victims may say that no
amount of money can ever repair the harm, they will often be sensitive to
decreases in compensation as devaluing the harm they have suffered.  This
situation will be all the more acute where the explanation comes from the
defendant, who is perceived as the cause, and is simply hiding behind the law
instead of taking responsibility.
Two recent MDL settlements serve as exemplars of two different ways in
which uncertainty on the merits can require the defendant to employ an
adversarial process to resolve the claims.  The first example comes from the
NFL concussion MDL.  In those cases, there was substantial uncertainty about
whether the science supported the variety of claims raised by the former play-
ers.202  Resolving the lawsuit required the development of scientific evidence
about the long-term harm of repeated concussions, as well as substantial dis-
covery about the defendants’ knowledge of these potential risks and efforts to
202 See Joseph M. Hanna, Concussions May Prove to Be a Major Headache for the NFL: Play-
ers’ Class Action Suit Places a Bounty on the League, N.Y. ST. B.A. J. Oct. 2012, at 10, 13 (noting
the NFL had “several defenses at its disposal” and that predictions about litigation were
“speculative at best”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 54  8-DEC-14 14:51
388 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
mitigate these harms.203  Moreover, recent studies suggest that the greater
concussion risk may lay not in the players’ NFL time, but in their years of
high school and college play where medical treatment and protective equip-
ment are typically less sophisticated.204  Once the litigation matured and
counsel were able to reach a greater degree of certainty on the causation
issues, the parties were able to enter into a court-approved settlement.205
The second example comes from the pending transvaginal mesh
cases.206  Like the NFL case, the defendants questioned whether the mesh
was actually defective.207  But, even assuming it was, there were still many
individual questions of not only claims valuation but also causation,208 which
would likely create such variation in awards that the settlement could lose
legitimacy.  Early on it became apparent that many victims had multiple
devices implanted, raising questions of causation as between competing cor-
porations.209  Moreover, counsel likely anticipated individualized questions
about whether the injuries alleged were a result of the underlying medical
condition that prompted the initial surgery, were a known risk of the surgery,
were a result of error by the surgeon in the implantation process, or were
instead a result of the device malfunctioning.  Furthermore, to the extent
that the challenges are based upon the discussions between the manufac-
turer and a surgeon, there could be further individualized questions about
not only the content of those discussions but the reasonability of attributing
the responsibility to the manufacturer rather than the trained surgeon treat-
ing the individual patient—who may therefore have been in a better position
to weigh treatment options.
2. Individualized Damages
Even if issues of liability could be resolved, the individualized questions
surrounding any particular individual’s right to recover and the amount of
that recovery can threaten the legitimacy of a bilateral mass settlement.210  As
occurred in the BP class action, a defendant may agree to a class settlement
203 Ken Belson, Concussion Suit to Cost N.F.L. $765 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at
A1 (noting the mounting scientific evidence concerning the long-term harm of concus-
sions and the NFL’s knowledge of those harms).
204 Grant L. Iverson et al., Cumulative Effects of Concussion in Amateur Athletes, 18 BRAIN
INJURY 433, 440–41 (2004).
205 Belson, supra note 191.
206 See In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prod. Liab. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 502, 507–08
(S.D. W. Va. 2014).
207 See id. at 508–09.
208 See id. at 519–22.
209 FDA Public Health Notification: Serious Complications Associated with Transvaginal Place-
ment of Surgical Mesh in Repair of Pelvic Organ Prolapse and Stress Urinary Incontinence, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/Alerts
andNotices/PublicHealthNotifications/ucm061976.htm.
210 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
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that leaves these individualized determinations to the settlement
administrator.211
3. Formal Closure
Indeed, the defendant may prefer the closure afforded by a class
action.212  But, if a defendant chose to pursue these claims as a mechanism
for preventing class certification, it would likely prevail given the increasingly
stringent standards for certification.
Implicit in these examples is the notion that MDL is unlikely to effec-
tively vindicate small-value claims because of the opt-in nature of the litiga-
tion, unless it incorporates a class action lawsuit.  Rather, the value of MDL is
in reducing the investment asymmetries and inefficiencies of claimants’
duplicative development of generic assets.  Instead, MDL allows a pooling of
these resources and costs in the development of generic assets.  At the same
time, because these claims are large enough in value that the individuals are
incentivized to file individual claims, many would see a normative benefit in
resting the autonomy to pursue one’s own litigation strategy or settlement
terms in the individual claimant’s hands.
But while MDL may strike a normatively beneficial balance between col-
laboration and autonomy for higher value claims, this system begins to col-
lapse as the claims’ values becomes smaller.  A general correlation exists
between the size of a claim and participation by plaintiffs, such that smaller
value claims generally illicit lower participation rates.  For plaintiffs’ counsel,
this decreases the opportunity for cost spreading as to both the underlying
litigation costs, as well as the additional costs the heightened procedural
steps inherent to MDL entail.  Likewise, for defendants, MDL does not offer
closure; thus, the corporation cannot definitively predict the total outlay nec-
essary to buy peace, unless it waits to settle the claims until the statute of
limitations period has expired.
Taken together, MDL can be an effective mechanism for providing com-
pensation to victims, as well as vindicating the plaintiffs’ autonomy interests
to a higher degree than in class actions.  However, because of the de facto
opt-in nature of MDL claims, the level of deterrence provided by an MDL is
pegged to the number of victims that choose to pursue relief.
4. Auto-Pay Options
One of the largest outstanding questions potentially on the horizon with
respect to privatized mass settlement is the extent to which these settlements
can maintain an opt-in structure.  At present, many settlements require the
absent class members to file claims forms or otherwise provide updated con-
tact information in order to receive compensation.  Thus, requiring a claims
form or opt-in structure in private mass settlement does not decrease com-
211 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (E.D.
La. 2012).
212 See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 27, at 270–74.
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pensation relative to a class action in which an identical form would be filed
or an MDL settlement in which the plaintiff must file his or her own claim.
As technology advances, companies have increasing capability to elec-
tronically credit plaintiffs’ accounts.  One can envision a world on the not-
too-distant horizon in which distributors’ sales records or credit card state-
ments could allow a company to determine with precision who bought the
product in question and credit their accounts.  For some claims this might be
a terrific innovation, allowing companies to quickly correct their errors.
But what about cases in which the claim is one that the company expects
few would make?  Should offering a voluntary refund program be enough?
Or must the company really offer a full refund to every identifiable purchaser
of Crunch’N Nutter in order to prevent a class action over its inclusion of
nuts?  The courts’ determination of this issue will vastly impact the incentive
for corporations to engage in voluntary refund programs and the frequency
of small-value litigation.
D. The New Generation of Opt-in Mass Claims Mechanisms
As described in preceding sections, aggregation has shifted from the
traditional mandatory and opt-out class action mechanisms toward a new
generation of opt-in mechanisms.  This Section explores the predominant
mechanisms from the perspective of the parties, developing a more robust
conception of the types of cases likely to be pursued through these compet-
ing mechanisms—and their limits.
1. The Capacities of MDL Relative to Private Mass Settlement
As described in Part II, avoiding the procedural costs of MDL and the
resolution of potential merits issues can generate a large pool of joint gains
for division between the parties.213  Thus, as a baseline matter, bilateral mass
settlement offers the superior option for the parties by decreasing the wealth
transfer to third parties—namely, lawyers and experts.  These mass settle-
ment offers can be structured not only as flat rate offers, but also as grid
settlements or even formula settlements such that substantially individualized
damages calculations can be undertaken.214
But, as legal complexity increases, the benefits of bilateral mass settle-
ments begin to decline.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, victims are less
able to accurately assess the fairness of the mass offer, which can decrease
legitimacy and, in turn, participation rates.215  Second, the extent to which
the court will deny class certification based upon the existence of a settle-
ment offer is inherently tied to proof that the offer is equal to or superior to
213 See supra Part II.
214 For a typology of claims fund types in the aggregate litigation context, see Dodge,
supra note 18, at 1273–83; McGovern, supra note 22, at 1372–73.
215 Accord Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 33, at 405 (discussing the uncertainty in risk
transfer premiums as necessitating shifts in the GCCF payout structure and ultimately
becoming one of the benefits of the MDL settlement).
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the potential class recovery for the absent class members.  Thus, as the com-
plexity increases, the extent to which the company must overcompensate as
against the expected outcome in order to ensure that it has provided full
compensation notwithstanding the uncertainty increases.  As this delta grows,
the value of bilateral mass settlement over MDL declines.
Thus, to the extent that the claim poses complex legal questions, resolu-
tion of which will determine the existence of liability or substantially impact
damages valuation, MDL should be the preferred dispute resolution mecha-
nism.  MDL is structured to include plaintiffs’ counsel and provides for judi-
cial resolution of the issue, enhancing legitimacy.  And, of course, to the
extent the parties do not wish to bear this risk, settlements are regularly
entered through the MDL process.  In contrast, bilateral mass settlement
lacks these mechanisms.  Indeed, even where defendants have attempted to
enter into a form of privatized class certification, negotiating with plaintiffs’
counsel without the formal class certification procedure, these processes have
lacked legitimacy with victims.
But MDL inherently imposes delay upon the parties as well as increased
litigation costs—even if, for plaintiffs, these can be spread.  Thus, for individ-
ual victims whose claim has a high degree of certainty, accepting a bilateral
mass settlement offer may be preferable as it allows a greater net recovery
sooner than the MDL process.  For defendants, if a substantial number of
claims can be settled, this may cause the aggregation of costs within the MDL
to begin to collapse as the number of plaintiffs—and in turn the amount of
damages—across which the costs can be spread is decreased.  This may in
turn prompt another round of settlement.  Bilateral settlements may thus
reduce claims to such an extent that alternative aggregation mechanisms like
joinder become a superior option to MDL.  But they may also simply narrow
the scope of the MDL, settling the clearest claims and allowing the MDL to
focus upon the most difficult claims.
From this perspective then, MDL can be summarized as providing actual
compensation to victims and setting deterrence to the opt-in level.  However,
functionally it is limited in scope (absent an embedded class action) to rela-
tively large claims that are capable of driving opt-in litigation.  Moreover, it
offers unique value relative to bilateral mass settlement in cases of high
uncertainty—whether factual or legal—that require the presence of plain-
tiffs’ counsel to assess the viability of the defenses presented and, if appropri-
ate, litigate these issues before the court.
2. Selecting Between Privatization Mechanisms: Arbitration vs. Mass
Settlement
As companies have increasingly incorporated pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, consumer and employment, many scholars have suggested that these
provisions are subject to unique impediments to market functioning and
argued for restrictions or prohibitions on these terms.  Indeed, in recent
years, legislation denying enforcement of pre-dispute consumer and employ-
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ment arbitration provisions has become common in Congress.216  Yet, so far,
proponents have been unable to obtain the political support necessary to
pass such a measure.
This Article raises a heretofore unidentified possibility: that doctrinal
developments in the treatment of mass settlement offers may diminish the
relative benefit of arbitration clauses.  Traditionally, corporations understood
the risk of class actions being filed on nuisance claims, as well as the possibil-
ity of blackmail settlements.  In order to prevent this over-enforcement, many
corporations adopted arbitration provisions and other dispute resolution
provisions designed to convert claims to opt-in, single plaintiff status.  Yet,
these provisions only operate as a default rule.  In practice, companies are
exploring the use of informal post-dispute mechanisms for quasi-aggregation;
for example, replicating the bellwether trial model of litigation within the
arbitration process to facilitate settlement of mass claims.217
But the emerging doctrine governing bilateral mass settlement removes
this in terrorem effect by holding that, so long as the compensation offered is
equal to or exceeds the recovery available to each individual in class litiga-
tion, the class cannot be certified.  Thus, to the extent that post-dispute set-
tlements can both be made and preclude the formation of an opt-out class,
the risk to the corporation of nuisance class actions is reduced.  The com-
pany can obtain the same desired opt-in mechanism post-dispute.
For many companies, given the option of committing pre-dispute to
arbitration or waiting until post-dispute to make a mass settlement offer,
there may be substantial benefits in taking the latter approach.  The bilateral
mass settlement offer allows the company to undertake a careful assessment
of the particular dispute in issue, and to offer a tailored response.  In con-
trast, pre-dispute provisions must be drafted broadly to avoid bifurcation—a
determination that only some of the claims are subject to arbitration and
thus that the claim must proceed simultaneously in both the arbitral and
litigation forums.  But, drafting a broad provision risks the possibility that ex
post the clause will be too broad—for example, where the dispute is one as to
which the company does not want to face seriatim litigation or where such
repetition risks inconsistent judgments.  Indeed, it was this precise dynamic
that initially led to the creation of Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).218
For many corporations, the choice between committing to a dispute res-
olution ex ante or ex post may seem a simple one: corporations almost always
prefer to have more information and certainty in making a decision rather
than less.  Thus, in most cases, with the innovation of bilateral mass settle-
216 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R.
1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
217 See Alex Kozinski & Andrew Bentz, Privatization and Its Discontents, 63 EMORY L.J.
263, 276–77 (2014).
218 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 614 (1996) (discussing Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)).
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ment, companies will see a substantial diminution in the value of arbitration
provisions.
But are there limits to this preference?  As a threshold matter, the pref-
erence for bilateral mass settlement turns upon its effectiveness as a mecha-
nism for informal or de facto closure.  Thus, to the extent that the
corporation anticipates claims that are difficult to value—and thus would
necessitate systematic overcompensation—pre-dispute arbitration may offer a
superior guarantee as against class certification.  Likewise, a company may
anticipate that the claims will be diverse enough that it will ultimately defeat
certification but, as the over decade-long class certification battle in the Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes case itself revealed, this can be an expensive and
hard-fought victory.219  Companies that anticipate claims with sufficient vari-
ability to undermine class certification—and thus likely too much variability
for mass settlement to offer closure—may continue to prefer to avoid the
litigation costs associated with the class certification fight by utilizing a pre-
dispute aggregation waiver.
Secondarily, although companies routinely offer mass settlements with-
out arousing any public notice, certain companies may expect that such a
settlement offer would be uniquely problematic for their business model.
For example, a corporation may expect that issuing an offer would harm its
corporate reputation to the extent that it suggests that it engaged in wrong-
doing.  Alternatively, the corporation may have a unique inability to identify
victims, such that false claims are highly likely but also non-identifiable.
Finally, the company may be subject to unique statutory reporting require-
ments or otherwise anticipate that the issue of a settlement offer could be
used against it in collateral litigation.220
Despite these limitations, the emerging doctrine governing bilateral
mass settlement suggests that it may provide a superior option for many cor-
porations—allowing them to avoid opt-out litigation just as an arbitration
provision would, but providing the added benefit of retaining control over
the nature of the proceedings until post-dispute.  This suggests that even if
arbitration fairness legislation is passed, it may well simply channel additional
disputes into bilateral mass settlement, rather than hindering the shift from
opt-out to opt-in mass claims resolution.
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR THEORY AND LAWMAKING
Bilateral mass settlements are but one part of a broader transition from
opt-out and mandatory classes toward opt-in processes.221  Yet, their role in
this transition is an indispensable one.  Bilateral mass settlement offers have
219 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
220 Riley v. De’Longhi Corp., No. 99-2305, 2000 WL 1690183, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 30,
2000) (holding that evidence of a previous product recall can be used as circumstantial
evidence that a current product is also defective).
221 For an excellent discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence constrict-
ing opt-out class actions and sanctioning the use of class waivers in arbitration, see Resnik,
supra note 89.
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the power to reach all types of claims, including those claims that were the
final bastion of the class action device.  Indeed, the claims that have the
coherence necessary for a mass offer to preclude the later certification of a
class are the very claims that have the coherence necessary for certification in
a post-Dukes world.  But, this also means that the cases in which corporations
will obtain the least closure and thus have the least incentive to create a pri-
vate mass settlement fund are the cases in which post-Dukes certification is
the least likely—leaving the victims to pursue individual redress through sin-
gle plaintiff litigation, joinder, or MDL.
As we stand on the precipice of this new opt-in world, can we make any
predictions about its contours?  The foregoing analysis suggests that bilateral
mass settlement offers the greatest benefit in small-value cases, particularly
where the harm alleged is one that few other putative class members are
likely to pursue—whether due to their frivolous nature or simply because of
the opportunity cost of filing even a simple online claim.  In contrast, where
there are substantial factual or legal issues outstanding that have the poten-
tial to vastly shift claims value and the claim’s value is large enough to merit
the filing of litigation, MDL is likely to remain the preferred option for
defendants.222  Finally, pre-dispute arbitration provisions are likely to con-
tinue to serve as a fail-safe for corporations that anticipate unique aggrega-
tion defense costs and an inability to obtain closure from bilateral mass
settlement offers.  Taken together, these opt-in mechanisms have the capac-
ity to reach all types of claims.
But, the degree of quasi-closure a corporation receives—and in turn the
extent to which it is willing to fund these programs—varies substantially.
This in turn creates a patchwork, in which in some areas claims will only be
able to be pursued on an individual basis, while in others class actions will
continue to be filed in substantial numbers.  Yet, this patchwork is difficult to
justify on a theoretical level: where parties enter into not simply a contractual
relationship, but a written contract, the claim may be subjected to a pre-dis-
pute arbitration provision.  Of the remaining claims, those that are for objec-
tively and easily ascertained damages can be subjected to a mass settlement
offer that precludes subsequent class litigation.  But, if the claim is for a more
variable or subjective damage, then the court may still grant class certifica-
tion.  Thus, only in this one area should the legislature anticipate opt-out
rather than opt-in levels of private enforcement.
But, of course, these lines do not necessarily track the contours of sub-
stantive law.  Instead, claims for the same violation may fall within opt-out
and opt-in mechanisms.  These inconsistent levels of enforcement make it
222 Although not discussed extensively in the literature, MDL is properly characterized
as an opt-in process.  MDL merely transfers similar litigation into a single court for pretrial
proceedings.  Unless a class action is filed within the MDL, victims that do not affirmatively
file an action are not incorporated into either the damages calculation nor receive any
payment.  Thus, for purposes of both compensation and deterrence, MDL effectively oper-
ates on an opt-in basis requiring individuals to affirmatively seek vindication of their rights
and compensation.
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difficult, if not impossible, for the legislature to accurately predict enforce-
ment rates and determine the extent to which the law should be modified to
correct for over- or under-deterrence.
Likewise, these lines do not comport with the comparative value of a
class action.  These variations between claimants may well be sufficient to
prevent class certification based on challenges to commonality, typicality, and
adequacy, or on grounds of manageability.  But, even if the class can be certi-
fied, these variations among claimants inevitably lead to one of two
outcomes.
First, the differences may be minimized, with the settlement offering
average damages or a basic damages grid to calculate compensation.  Yet, if
the variations between victims were too great for the court to find that the
defendant’s mass settlement offer could provide full compensation to each
individual, class settlement structures will simply replicate this failing.  Thus,
the victims will continue to be subjected to a threat of undercompensation
(violating their due process rights) or overcompensation (violating the
defendant’s due process rights).223
Second, the class settlement may provide for individualized compensa-
tion determinations.  To the extent that this requires the individual to com-
plete a claim form stating his damages, this replicates the compensation
structure already on offer in the mass settlement.  But while the mass settle-
ment operates on a claims-made basis, with the company paying all claims
made against it, class settlements almost always operate on a fixed fund
claims model.224  In a fixed fund model, the defendant agrees to a total lump
sum payment, which the settlement administrator then uses to pay the claims
made.225  Thus, it is the victim, rather than the defendant, that bears the risk
that the fund will ultimately prove too small to compensate all victims where
an individualized inquiry is undertaken.
More broadly, the class action operates on a model that is based on
coherence between claims.  While procedural innovation can be utilized to
allow for these individualized determinations, doing so reduces the compara-
tive benefit of class actions over other dispute resolution models.  From this
perspective, the one area in which class actions may retain their poignancy
despite the innovation of bilateral mass settlement offers is the area in which
it offers the comparatively weakest benefits to the victims.  This recognition
suggests the need for a new generation of scholarship, informing the nascent
doctrine and offering a more intellectually coherent and theoretically satisfy-
ing path for the incorporation of mass settlement into our aggregative
regime.
223 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
224 See Dodge, supra note 18, at 1263–87. But cf. NFL Concussion Settlement Website, supra
note 185.
225 Dodge, supra note 18, at 1263–87.
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CONCLUSION
No longer are opt-out class actions the dominant form of mass claims
resolution; instead, we are witnessing a radical shift to opt-in mechanisms
that return to a world in which the individual must take some action to vindi-
cate her own claim.  In this system, defendants are not presumptively tasked
with paying damages for 100% of the potential victims; rather, they need only
compensate the fraction who file a claim.  This of course raises substantial
questions about what enforcement level should be considered optimal.
While the opt-out presumption reflected a common normative view of recent
decades, in the shadow of the Rules Enabling Act and overlapping jurisdic-
tion, there is an increasing question about what optimal enforcement
means—and whether it may even vary transsubstantively.
Moving beyond the opt-in versus opt-out concerns, a second dimension
of normative questions surround the impact of private mass claims funds on
the functions of litigation.  These new mechanisms offer the chance for vic-
tims and defendants to be simultaneously made better off through the reduc-
tion of transfers to third parties—particularly litigation costs.  Of course,
these savings come at the cost of reduced public transparency with respect to
the underlying wrong and the injuries and damages themselves.  Scholars
have expressed concern that defendants will utilize these offers to undercom-
pensate even those individuals that file claims, thereby undermining not only
compensation, but also deterrence.
This Article has posited that a far more complex and nuanced analysis is
necessary, given the rich diversity of claims funds, their differing goals, loci of
information, and participation rates.  The developing doctrine has motivated
corporations to offer full compensation to claimants by making this the stan-
dard for preclusion of class certification.  In this shadow, corporations have
offered full compensation, effectively trading the risk of punitive damages for
immediate compensation rather than discounting the compensation offered.
Others have offered super-compensation, exceeding that available by law in
these compensation systems.
But, some scholars have suggested that even with these doctrinal devel-
opments, individual claimants do better in aggregate settlements than private
mass claims funds because collective bargaining allows the capture of a clo-
sure premium.  Using the Deepwater Horizon example cited by these schol-
ars, this Article has posited an alternative hypothesis: public-private litigation
linkages.  Increasingly, the wrongs that prompt the creation of private rights
of action also trigger overlapping public actions—both regulatory and adju-
dicative.  As such, the private mass claims funds are not isolated resolution
mechanisms, but are undertaken in this broader litigation context.  As par-
ties’ sophistication increases, we may well see increasing linkages between
these public and private actions—adding yet another level of complexity, and
additional normative questions, to the privatization of mass claims processes.
